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MODEL FEDERAL STATUTE FOR THE EDUCATION OF
TALENTED AND GIFTED CHILDREN
MARY Lou HERRING*
INTRODUCTION
Melinda's history of drug and alcohol abuse began in junior high
school. She often thought of suicide and even tried it once. John had been
labeled a "trouble maker" in his school days. He had been considered for
placement in a class for behaviorally disabled students. What do Melinda
and John have in common? Both of these children are gifted.'
While the mention of "gifted" normally brings to mind a model stu-
dent, one who is attentive and well-behaved, studies indicate that many
gifted persons 2 display behavioral problems because they are inappropri-
ately or inadequately served by the schools. 3 Failure to satisfy the educa-
tional needs of gifted students endangers the tremendous potential these
people have to contribute to our society. 4 Because of insufficient attention
to this valuable resource, the full potential that rests within gifted stu-
dents is never realized. Tragically, too often, that potential is lost forever.
The boredom, frustration and anger experienced by gifted children who
feel uncomfortably different from other children causes a higher suicide
rate for gifted students than for any other group of students. 5 For some
* I am grateful to Professor Molly Lien for her thoughtful comments and encouragement
throughout the various stages of this Note, and to Professor Ralph Brill for the initial suggestion to
propose a new statute. I am especially grateful to my family for their support throughout this entire
process.
1. These students are described in Gail Hanninen et al., Gifted Students Are at Risk Too, in
CURRICULUM IN CONTEXT, Spring/Summer 1990, at 12-13.
2. The Jacob K. Javits Gifted and Talented Students Education Act of 1988, the current fed-
eral talented and gifted education act, defines talented and gifted children as those children who
"give evidence of high performance capability in areas such as intellectual, creative, artistic, or lead-
ership capacity, or in specific academic fields." 20 U.S.C. § 3063 (1988). For further discussion on
the definition of "gifted," see infra notes 236-41 and accompanying text.
3. Hanninen, supra note 1, at 12. See also Flyer from Illinois Council for the Gifted (research
has indicated that up to twenty percent of high school drop-outs may be gifted students).
4. Juanita S. Sorenson, The Gifted Program: An Overview, in THE GIFTED PROGRAM HAND-
BOOK 1, 2 (Juanita S. Sorenson ed., 1988) (in proportion to the total population, the gifted popula-
tion contributes more to society in all areas of human endeavor). See also Fund for the Advancement
of Education, A Summing Up, in EDUCATING THE GIFTED, ACCELERATION AND ENRICHMENT
138, 161 (William C. George et al. eds., 1979) (in fact, the health and vigor of our society depends on
utilizing each individual's capacity).
5. Flyer from Illinois Council for the Gifted. See also THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR
GIFTED CHILDREN, ON BEING GIFTED, 34 (1978) ("[Y]ou often feel that life is futile, .. . that you
might just commit suicide."); Hanninen, supra note 1, at 12 (a study conducted in four Texas coun-
ties found that sixteen percent of teenage suicides were committed by gifted students).
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students, then, an adequately challenging education is a matter of life and
death.
It is estimated that gifted children constitute three to twenty percent
of the population. 6 Currently, the federal government has addressed
gifted education by providing grants to state and local educational agen-
cies and to public and private agencies to assist in establishing and
strengthening talented and gifted (TAG) programs. 7 Almost all of the
states have some statutory provisions for TAG education. 8 Despite these
statutory provisions, estimates indicate that up to fifty percent of gifted
students are unidentified or underserved. 9
This Note proposes a new federal TAG Act. Part I of this Note
discusses state constitutional provisions for education and state statutes
that provide gifted education in varying degrees. Judicial interpretations
of state education statutes demonstrate the minimal educational stan-
dards that are acceptable throughout the country. Varying statutory pro-
visions and a judiciary that is reluctant to challenge minimal educational
standards frustrate attempts to better meet the actual educational needs
of gifted children. The urgent need to address gifted education on a fed-
eral level is discussed in Part II. Potential constitutional challenges to the
proposed federal TAG Act also are examined in Part II. Finally, Part III
will present a proposed model federal statute for the education of tal-
ented and gifted children.
I. CURRENT STATE STATUTORY AND JUDICIAL PROVISIONS FOR
GIFTED EDUCATION
A. State Constitutional and Statutory Education Requirements
Many states have recognized the need to address the educational
needs of gifted students and have enacted statutes to address those needs.
As commendable as those efforts have been in some states, the overall
impact of these statutes is unimpressive. The inadequacy of many stat-
utes in meeting the critical educational needs of gifted students has al-
6. STEVEN S. GOLDBERG, SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW 113 (1982) (the author believes that
TAG children represent ten percent of the total population). But another author states that educa-
tors generally agree that between three to five percent of school-age children are gifted or talented.
When using the IQ test as the definition of "gifted," approximately ten percent of the population
should be considered gifted. In fact, gifted students represent ten to twenty percent of the general
population, when all factors are considered. See Sorenson, supra note 4, at 3.
7. 20 U.S.C. § 3064 (1988). But see GOLDBERG, supra note 6, at 114 (since the federal TAG
Act is a grant program, not a civil rights law, the funding does not hinge on nondiscrimination
against the beneficiaries).
8. See infra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
9. Perry A. Zirkel & Paul L. Stevens, The Law Concerning Public Education of Gifted Stu-
dents, 34 EDUC. L. REP. 353, 353 (1979).
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lowed a precious resource to continue to be untapped and wasted. This
inadequacy in state TAG acts supports federal involvement in the educa-
tion of America's gifted students.
The authority to provide public education is provided by state con-
stitutions. While the constitutions mandate some public education, they
are usually silent regarding the quality of education that must be pro-
vided, although some of the constitutions specifically identify the policies
underlying governmental support of education.' 0 Some state constitu-
tional provisions for public school systems include terms such as "thor-
ough,"'" "adequate,"' 2 "efficient,"' 3 "general,"' 14 or "uniform.' 5 Some
state constitutions specifically provide for a "quality"' 6 education, while
others merely require the establishment of a public school system. 17
State statutes do, however, establish the requirements of the school
10. See, e.g., ARK. CONsT. art. 14, § 1 ("Intelligence and virtue being the safeguards of liberty
and the bulwark of a free and good government..."); IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § I ("The stability of a
republican form of government depending mainly upon the intelligence of the people..."); KAN.
CONST. art. 6, § 1 ("The legislature shall provide for intellectual, educational, vocational and scien-
tific improvement..."); LA. CONST. art. VIII, preamble ("The goal of the public educational system
is to provide learning environments... designed to promote excellence in order that every individual
may be afforded an equal opportunity to develop to his full potential"); ME. CONST. art. VIII, § 1
("A general diffusion of the advantages of education being essential to the preservation of the rights
and liberties of the people..."); MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1 ("It is the goal of the people to establish
a system of education which will develop the full educational potential of each person"); N.C.
CONST. art. IX, § 1 ("... knowledge being necessary to good government and the happiness of
mankind, schools, libraries, and the means of education shall forever be encouraged"); N.D. CONST.
art. VIII, § I ("A high degree of intelligence, . . . on the part of every voter in a government by the
people being necessary in order to insure the continuance of that government and the prosperity and
happiness of the people..."); TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1 ("A general diffusion of knowledge being
essential to the preservation of the liberties and rights of the people...").
11. See, e.g., IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 1; MD. CONST. art. VIII,§ 1; MINN. CONST. art XIII,
§ I; OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2.
12. See, e.g., GA. CONsT. art. VIII, § 1, para. I.
13. See, e.g., ARK. CONST. art. 14, § 1; DEL. CONST. art. X, § 1; Ky. CONST. § 183; MD.
CONST. art. VIII, § 1; MINN. CONST. art XIII, § I; N.J. CONST. art. 8, § IV, § 1; OHIo CONST. art.
VI, § 2; TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
14. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONsT. art. XI, § 1; DEL. CONST. art. X, § 1; IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 1;
MINN. CONST. art XIII, § I; N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 3; S.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; WASH. CONST.
art. IX, § 2.
15. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. XI, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1; IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § I;
MINN. CONsT. art XIII, § 1; NEV. CONST. art. 11, § 2; N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2; N.D. CONST. art.
VIII, § 2; S.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 2; Wis. CONST. art. X, § 3; Wyo.
CONST. art. 7, § 1.
16. See, e.g., MONT. CONST. art. X, § I ("The legislature shall provide a basic system of free
quality public elementary and secondary schools"); VA. CONST. art. VIII, § I ("The General Assem-
bly ... shall seek to ensure that an educational program of high quality is established and continu-
ally maintained").
17. E.g., ALA. CONsT. art. XIII, § 1; IOWA CONST. art. IX, § 12; LA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1;
ME. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; MISS. CONST. art. 8 § 201 (leaves to the discretion of the legislature.);
Mo. CONST. art. IX, § l(a); NEB. CONsT. art. VII, § 1; N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1; OKLA. CONsT. art.
13 § 1; S.C. CONST. art. XI, § 3; TENN. CONST. art. 11, § 12. Cf R.I. CONST. art. XII, § 1 (rather
than providing a school system, the general assembly has the duty to adopt all means to secure to the
people the "advantages and opportunities of education").
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curriculum, which vary from state to state.18 These statutes provide a
range of standards from merely providing a curriculum to requiring a
curriculum that is adapted to the needs of the students. Some state stat-
utes have actually provided for a quality, rather than a minimal,
education. 19
In addition to general education statutes, most state legislatures also
have enacted statutes that specifically address the unique educational re-
quirements of gifted children. Generally, the states are recognizing that
gifted students require some instruction other than that offered to the
general student population.20 The reasons stated for gifted education
recognize that special instruction is required for a gifted student to reach
his or her full potential, 21 and that the state has an obligation to chal-
lenge students.22
The variation in general educational standards from state to state
also is present in the Talented and Gifted Education (TAG) statutes. In
states that have TAG laws, the statutes may range from permissive to
mandatory. Permissive statutes authorize the state department of educa-
tion to address the unique educational requirements of gifted children. 23
18. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-151(b)(4)(A) (Michie 1987) (one of the primary purposes
of high school programs is to prepare students for entry into their chosen career fields); N.J. STAT.
§ 18A:7A-5(c) (West 1989) (the intention of instruction is merely the "attainment of reasonable
levels of proficiency in basic communications and computational skills").
19. MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-1-2(g) (1972) (the educational policy in Mississippi is to provide
quality education with excellence and high achievement of all students as the ultimate goal).
20. MD. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 8-202 (1989). See also Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-23-173 (1972)
(gifted students "require additional opportunities to allow them to develop their capabilities to their
fullest potential").
21. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-761(4) (Supp. 1990). See also CAL. EDUC. CODE
§ 52200(c)(2) (West Supp. 1990) (learning environments should provide TAG children with the
opportunity to acquire skills and understanding equal to their potential); IND. CODE ANN. § 20-
10.1-7-4.5 (Burns 1985) (programs should encourage gifted children to develop to their greatest
potential in intellectual, social and artistic skills); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-961 (1985) (educational
opportunities should contribute to the development of each gifted child in accord with his or her
abilities); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 8101 (West 1983) (the legislature recognized that TAG
education is necessary for a realization of the educational potential of TAG students and their poten-
tial contribution to themselves and to society); NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-339 (1987) (gifted children
need special facilities or educational services to assist the development of their potential, which may
increase the contribution they make to society); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 4452(1)(a) (McKinney Supp.
1990); N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-59-01(2) (Supp. 1989); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 118.35 (West Supp. 1990)
(services not ordinarily provided in a regular school program are needed in order to fully develop the
capabilities of gifted students).
22. COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-26-101 (1988).
23. ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-42-102 (Michie 1987); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 52206 (West Supp.
1990); COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-20-102.5 (1988); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 3126 (1981); IOWA
CODE § 257.43 (West Supp. 1990) (repealed effective July 1, 2001); MD. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 8-203
(1989); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 388.1647 (West Supp. 1990) (Michigan funds districts that
develop and provide comprehensive programs and support services for TAG students); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 162.720(1) (Vernon Supp. 1990) (gifted programs may be established when a sufficient
number of children need the programs for their development); MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-7-902
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The decision to provide education designed for gifted children remains
with the respective state departments of education, or the local school
districts. However, the mandatory statutes require each school district to
provide educational programs to all identified gifted children.24
State TAG statutes generally authorize the state boards of education
to promulgate rules and regulations related to TAG education, such as
identification of gifted children, 25 or the approval of programs that are
developed for gifted education. 26 The statute also may create a section
within the department of education or an advisory council to assist the
school system in the development, implementation and administration of
gifted programs. 27 Or, it may authorize the state department of education
to purchase educational services from private organizations. 28 Most of
the development of the actual program for gifted education takes place in
local school districts.29 The statutes themselves do not contain any spe-
cific guidelines for establishment of gifted programs.
The school district may directly provide the program, join in a coop-
(1989); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 4452 (McKinney Supp. 1990); N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-59-04 (Supp.
1989); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-42-1 (1988); WASH. REV. CODE § 28A. 16.060 (Supp. 1990).
24. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 16-39-4 (1987); ALASKA STAT. § 14.30.186 (1987); ARiz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 15-770(B) (Supp. 1990); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-152 (Supp. 1989); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 20-10.1-7-4.5 (Bums 1985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 8104 (West Supp. 1990) (in Maine,
the school districts are required to establish a plan for phasing in TAG educational programs by
1991-92); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 20, § 4703 (West Supp. 1990) (currently, the provision of TAG educa-
tion in Maine is optional); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 122.94 (West Supp. 1990); MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-
23-175 (1972); NEV. REV. STAT. § 388.450 (1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-1 13(g) (1987); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 1210.307 (West Supp. 1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 343.409 (Supp. 1990); 22 PA.
CODE § 13.21 (1990); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-29-170 (Law. Co-op. 1990); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 13-33-14 (Supp. 1989); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-10-101 (1990); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN.
§ 21.652 (West Supp. 1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-253.13:1(D)(7) (Supp. 1989); W. VA. CODE
§ 18-20-1 (Supp. 1990); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 118.35 (West Supp. 1990).
25. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-42-102 (Michie 1987); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 52200 (West
Supp. 1990); COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-20-105 (1988); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14 § 3126 (1981); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 257.42 (West Supp. 1990); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 8102 (West 1983); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 37-23-177 (1972); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 13-33-16 (Supp. 1989).
26. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 257.42 (West Supp. 1990)(repealed effective July 1, 2001);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 8102 (West 1983); Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-23-177(c) (1972); N.Y.
EDUC. LAW § 4452 (McKinney Supp. 1990); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.654 (West Supp. 1991).
27. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-42-103 (Michie 1987); ILL REV. STAT. ch. 122, para. 14A-
4 (1989); IOWA CODE ANN. § 257.48 (West Supp. 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-964 (Supp. 1989);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1944 (West 1982); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 388.1094 (West 1988)
(Michigan's TAG statute created a TAG commission on education to make recommendations to the
state board of education regarding a comprehensive TAG education program and to provide pro-
posed legislation to implement the plan); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 162.720(2) (Vernon Supp. 1990); N.Y.
EDUC. LAW § 4453 (McKinney Supp. 1990).
28. COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-26-101 (1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1950 (West 1982). See also
ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-20-312 (Michie 1987) (Arkansas also earmarks funds for TAG program
development).
29. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 52200 (West Supp. 1990); ILL REV. STAT. ch. 122, para.
14A-I (1989); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1948(A) (West 1982); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.654
(West Supp. 1991).
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erative program with another district,30 or develop the program in coop-
eration with a private or public institution within the district.31 One
statute requires that a gifted curriculum at least more adequately meet
the needs of gifted students than the regular curriculum, 32 while another
emphasizes that the programs must be designed to educate children in
relation to their individual capacities and needs. 33 This can be accom-
plished by supplementing and supporting the regular educational
program. 34
However, state statutory provisions for education of gifted children
are not enough. A close look at the statutes causes some concern about
what is really being offered as gifted education. In Alaska, a gifted child
is entitled to an appropriate education that permits a child to benefit edu-
cationally. 35 But, the goal of educational benefit for any one individual
student is not necessarily obtained merely by saying that a gifted pro-
gram is offered. Several states provide education programs to meet the
needs of gifted students. These programs include some combination of
special curriculum 36 or adaptation of the regular curriculum. 37 Fre-
quently, program guidelines provide for grouping gifted students to facil-
itate teaching gifted students. 38 In some states, the district school board
may develop an educational center at the local university or community
30. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-967(4) (1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1947(D) (West
1982); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 4452(c) (McKinney Supp. 1990); OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 1210.307(A)(2)
(West Supp. 1991); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.654 (West Supp. 1991).
31. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-967(5) (1985); OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 1210.307(A)(3) (West Supp.
1991).
32. IND. ADMIN. CODE tit. 511 r.6-9-2(a)(l) (Supp. 1990).
33. See, e.g., WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 392-170-080 (1986) (". • student shall be provided an
educational opportunity which takes into account such students unique needs and capabilities"); W.
VA. CODE § 18-20-1 (1988).
34. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70 § 1210.301(2) (West 1989).
35. ALASKA STAT. § 14.30.350(1) (1987).
36. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-764(C) (Supp. 1990) (a gifted program may require
expanding academic course offerings); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 52206 (West Supp. 1990) (gifted pro-
grams may consist of special classes, enrichment activities, or independent study).
37. See, e.g., Aaiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-764(D) (the statute allows, but does not mandate,
course modification and adaptation of teaching methods and then qualifies the benefit so that it can
only be offered to a group of gifted students, effectively reducing the danger of requiring each school
district to "become a Harvard or a Princeton to all who have IQ's over 130." Centennial Sch. Dist.
v. Dep't of Educ., 539 A.2d 785, 791 (Pa. 1988)); IND. ADMIN. CODE tit. 511 r. 6-9-6 (Supp. 1990)
(Indiana specifically requires modification of the standard curriculum in areas of goals, objectives,
content, pace and product to create a TAG curriculum).
38. See, e.g., IND. ADMIN. CODE tit. 511 r. 6-9-2(b) (Supp. 1990) (programs may be arranged
by using magnet schools, homogeneous grouping, or honors classes). See also Morris Meister &
Harold A. Odell, What Provisions for the Education of Gifted Students?, in EDUCATING THE GIFTED
67, 81-82 (William C. George et al. eds., 1979) (homogeneous grouping is arranging students in
divisions according to proficiency, rather than chronological age); id. at 69 (honors classes, organ-
ized around specific subject areas, provide an opportunity to offer enriched curriculum and higher
standards of achievement).
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college.39 Since the social, emotional and educational problems of gifted
children can be as complicated as those of the physically and mentally
handicapped,4° the challenge is to develop programs that meet the
unique educational needs of a diverse student population.
Under existing statutory frameworks, the fact that a student may
need special instruction to achieve his or her potential does not guarantee
that special instruction will be available in sufficient quantity or quality.
Since funding for TAG programs is often limited, TAG programs may
limit the number of students served,41 or the program hours.42 Also, if
the school district's efforts to meet the needs of gifted children has fo-
cused on development of an acceleration program, this may not be ap-
propriate for students who would benefit more from enrichment. 43 Those
students who would be better challenged in a group environment will be
frustrated if the district only offers independent study. Thus, absent clear
guidelines, there is no guarantee that a gifted curriculum will be appro-
priate for most gifted students.
Some states have attempted to meet the needs of gifted children by
including them in the definition of "exceptional children" 44 found in stat-
utes designed to answer the adequacy of programs that serve physically
or learning disabled children. Even in these states, programs for gifted
children are not necessarily mandated, or there may be additional bene-
fits or requirements for the disabled that are not available or required for
39. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122 para. 14A-6 (1989). See also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 233.0677 (West
1988) (the university provides the facilities and educational services such as the library, laboratory
facilities, and audio-visual materials and the school district is responsible for the personnel and the
program).
40. Sandra Stencel, Educating Gifted Children, in EDITORIAL RESEARCH REPORTS 119, 120
(1979).
41. See, e.g., TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 16.159(c) (West Supp. 1990) (no more than five per-
cent of the district's students are eligible for TAG funds).
42. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 52206 (West Supp. 1990) (TAG programs qualify for state
funding by merely providing 200 minutes of class time per week to the gifted curriculum); PRIS-
CILLA L. VAIL, THE WORLD OF THE GIFTED CHILD, 23-24 (1979) (One characteristic of some
gifted students is concentration. Children capable of long concentration must be given opportunities
to work for long periods of time in order to grow).
43. See, e.g., IND. ADMIN. CODE tit. 511 r.6-9-8(a)(2)(B) (Supp. 1990) (Indiana addresses this
issue by providing that appropriate educational services must be based on each student's needs and
characteristics).
44. Exceptional children also include the retarded, students with physical disabilities, including
speech, hearing or vision disabilities, the emotionally disturbed, and students with learning disabili-
ties. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 16-39-2 (1987); ALASKA STAT. § 14.30.350 (1987); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 15-761(5) (Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 228.041(18) (West Supp. 1990); GA. CODE
ANN. § 20-2-152(a) (Michie Supp. 1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-962(0 (Supp. 1989); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 1941 (West Supp. 1990) ("exceptional children" differ in physical, mental, social,
emotional or educational characteristics to the extent that special education is necessary to enable
them to develop to their maximum abilities); W. VA. CODE § 18-20-1 (Supp. 1990).
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the gifted.45 However, the categorization of gifted children with other
exceptional children can provide for an individualized education pro-
gram 46 and the procedural safeguards4 7 that go hand in hand with the
federal Education of the Handicapped Act. 48 This categorization can
greatly enhance the educational opportunities of the gifted child. A ma-
jor advantage of acts that have treated gifted children in the same way as
handicapped children is that procedural due process is available to par-
ents or guardians who wish to challenge the education the child is receiv-
ing. For example, in Centennial School District v. Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania Department of Education,49 the result of a due process
hearing was that a gifted child was entitled to the general enrichment
program for gifted children and to individualized instruction within an
age appropriate class setting in subjects where his academic performance
was well beyond grade level.50
Fulfilling the educational needs of gifted children requires a care-
fully written statute that provides for an adequately challenging educa-
tional environment. Although there are many statutes throughout the
fifty states, and even a federal statute, that authorize gifted education
programs, fifty percent of the gifted students continue to be underserved
and even unidentified. 51 While a model gifted statute must be carefully
drafted to balance the limited education funds and the critical educa-
45. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-764(D) (Supp. 1990) (special education for gifted
students does not require course modification or adaptation of teaching methods); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 22-20-103 (1988) (every handicapped child must be served, but programs for the gifted,
although encouraged, are voluntary); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-977 (1985) (exceptional children, ex-
cept for gifted, are required to enroll for and attend special education services); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 115C-1 10(d)(2) (1987) (exceptional children, other than gifted or pregnant students, are entitled to
an individualized education program. The minimum standard for the education of gifted students is
a group educational program); N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-59-04 (Supp. 1989) ("exceptional children
included handicapped and gifted children. School districts must provide special education for handi-
capped children, but special education for gifted students is optional"); 22 PA. CODE § 13.11(d)
(1990) (handicapped persons may be placed in an approved private school program to meet their
appropriate needs); 22 PA. CODE § 13.23 (1990) (gifted programs can be provided by co-operative
arrangements with other districts, but there is no provision for programs in private schools).
46. ALASKA STAT. § 14.30.278 (1987).
47. See e.g. ALASKA STAT. § 14.30.272 (1987); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-766(E) (Supp.
1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-973 (Supp. 1989); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1952 (West 1982); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 115C-113(g) (1987); 22 PA. CODE § 13.21 (1990). In addition, some states require the
parents' consent prior to evaluation or placement. See e.g. ALASKA STAT. § 14.30.191 (1987); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-766(E) (Supp. 1990); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1945(A) (West 1982).
48. See infra notes 119-138 and accompanying text.
49. 539 A.2d 785 (Pa. 1988).
50. Id. at 790. This case represents a major victory for gifted education. The court recognized
that merely offering an enrichment course did not relieve the school district from its duty to provide
for the individual need of the gifted student.
51. See infra Part II and supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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tional needs of gifted students, more importantly, the statute must en-
compass all gifted students in the United States.
B. The Inadequate Judicial Response to the Need for Quality
Education
A review of some judicial decisions in the area of education indicate
a reluctance, in the absence of statutory standards, to expand minimal
education standards. In fact, one court stated that a state constitutional
provision that required the legislature to provide a system of public
schools did not create a duty to individual students to insure even a mini-
mum level of education. 52 The judicial systems, both state and federal,
are reluctant to interfere with what is considered to be primarily an ad-
ministrative function. 53 To insure protection of the needs of gifted stu-
dents and to provide the desirable quality of education, a TAG statute
must specifically provide an educational standard that will survive judi-
cial challenge.
1. Educational Malpractice
When a school system has failed to provide an adequate education,
students have filed educational malpractice suits.54 Malpractice suits
have been filed because of the lack of quality of the education offered 5 or
negligent placement of a child in a special education environment. 56
52. Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 391 N.E.2d 1352, 1353 (N.Y. 1979).
53. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Board of Educ., 400 N.E.2d 317, 320 (N.Y. 1979) ("[T]he courts of
this State may not substitute their judgment, or the judgment of a jury, for the professional judgment
of educators and government officials.. ."); Donohue, 391 N.E.2d at 1354 (Control and management
of educational affairs is vested in the Board of Regents and the Commissioner of Education, not in
the courts). See also John Elson, A Common Law Remedy for the Educational Harms Caused by
Incompetent or Careless Teaching, 73 Nw. U.L. REV. 641, 645 (1978).
54. See, e.g., Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814 (1976); Doe
v. Board of Educ., 453 A.2d 814 (Md. 1982); Donohue, 391 N.E.2d 1352 (N.Y. 1979).
55. See, e.g. Peter W., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814 (1976) (high school graduate could not read above
the fifth grade level and the minimum requirement of the Education Code was an eighth grade
reading level); Torres v. Little Flower Children's Serv., 474 N.E.2d 223 (N.Y. 1984), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 874 (1985) (a child care agency fulfilled its duty to the child when the child was in attend-
ance at a public school. Because of public policy, the court would not extend the agency's liability to
include judgments concerning the child's education); Donohue, 391 N.E.2d 1352 (N.Y. 1979)
(although a high school graduate, plaintiff was unable to adequately read employment applications).
56. See, e.g., D.S.W. v. Fairbanks North Star Bourough Sch. Dist., 628 P.2d 554 (Alaska 1981)
(Nothing in the education of exceptional children act authorized a damage claim, but corrective
tutorial programs may be appropriately mandated); Doe v. Board of Educ., 453 A.2d 814 (Md.
1982) (The court system is not the proper forum to test the validity of a student's placement in a
particular educational program even when a student has been improperly placed in a mentally re-
tarded program for seven years); Hunter v. Board of Educ., 439 A.2d 582 (Md. 1982) (The court
dismissed the counts of negligent evaluation of a child's learning abilities, but remanded the case for
trial on the issue of whether liability could be found for willfully and maliciously injuring a child in
an educational context); DeRosa v. City of New York, 132 A.D.2d 592 (1987) (Even when a child is
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However, the courts have repeatedly rejected "educational malpractice"
as a cause of action in both types of cases. 57 In fact, courts have indicated
that they will only intervene in the administration of a public school sys-
tem when there are "gross violations" of public policy. 58
In general, courts have disallowed causes of action for education
malpractice for several reasons, mostly related to public policy. 59 First,
judicial decisions indicate that state constitutions directing the mainte-
nance of a public school system do not create a duty of the school district
owed to each individual child. 60 Second, courts are very reluctant to sub-
stitute their own judgments for that of the school board.61 In explaining
this reluctance, the courts have indicated that the courtroom is not the
place to evaluate varied theories of learning.62 If a court determines that
one teaching method is invalid, or one teacher's actions caused an injury,
the court is in effect creating school policy. 6 Courts have also indicated
that judicial decisions related to education are improper interferences
with the responsibilities of the school administrative agencies. 64 The
placed in a class for mentally deficient children because of a failure to perform physical tests that
would have indicated a hearing loss, the court will not hear a challenge to the defendant's "profes-
sional" judgment); Hoffman, 400 N.E.2d 317 (1979) (As a matter of public policy, the court dis-
missed a complaint against the school system for a failure to retest a student that was retained in a
program for mentally retarded children, even when the original evaluator had recommended the
placement with some reservation).
57. Note, Educational Malpractice: Judicial Recognition of a Limited Duty of Educators To-
ward Individual Students; a State Law Cause of Action for Educational Negligence, 1990 U. ILL. L.
REV. 475, 476 n. 11 (educational malpractice as a cause of action has been rejected by courts in
Alaska, California, Maryland, and New York).
58. See, e.g., Hunter v. Board of Educ., 439 A.2d 582, 587 (Md. 1982) (an individual educator
engaging in intentional torts against children entrusted to his educational care would not be shielded
from liability because of public policy considerations); Bennett v. City Sch. Dist., 497 N.Y.S.2d 72,
78-79 (N.Y. 1985) (the court will not order a school district to spend left-over funds in any particular
manner, even though some gifted students are enrolled in part-time programs because of the limited
availability of enrollment in the full-time program); Donohue v. Copiague Union Free Sch. Dist.,
391 N.E.2d 1352, 1354 (N.Y. 1979) (the courts would be obliged to recognize and correct broad
educational policies that are gross violations of defined public policy (quoting In re New York City
Sch. Bds. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 347 N.E.2d 568, 574 (N.Y. 1976)).
59. See, e.g., Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814 (1976); Torres
v. Little Flower Children's Service, 474 N.E.2d 223, 227 (N.Y. 1984), cert denied, 474 U.S. 864
(1985); Donohue, 391 N.E.2d 1352 (N.Y. 1979).
60. See, e.g., Peter W., 60 Cal. App. 3d at 824 (a duty exists when the plaintiff is entitled to
protection and the wrongs and injuries can be resolved within the existing judicial framework. Edu-
cational misfeasance does not meet these criteria); Donohue, 391 N.E.2d at 1353 (the state's obliga-
tion to provide a public school system is not the type of duty owed to an individual student, the
breach of which would entitle the student to monetary damages).
61. See, e.g., Donohue, 391 N.E.2d at 1354 (in fact, the purpose of administrative reviews of the
school system is to remove controversies from the courtroom); Ackerman v. Rubin, 231 N.Y.S.2d
112, 114 (1962) (the court will not substitute its judgment in the area of the educator's expertise).
62. Comment, Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School District: New York Chooses Not to Rec-
ognize "Educational Malpractice", 43 ALM. L. REV. 339, 340 (1979).
63. Elson, supra note 53, at 645-46.
64. See, e.g., Hunter v. Board of Educ., 439 A.2d 582, 585 (Md. 1982) (the state department of
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third reason for rejecting a cause of action for educational malpractice is
the difficulty in determining the proximate cause of a child's lack of pro-
gress. 65 Many factors outside of the classroom, especially economic and
domestic matters, can have a profound effect on a child's ability to
learn.66 Finally, the courts have stated that it is inappropriate to award
damages for educational malpractice, 67 especially because sufficient rem-
edies are available through the administrative channels.68 Therefore, it is
unnecessary for the courts to hear "educational malpractice" suits.
Even in special education environments, educational malpractice
suits charging negligent placement in special education classes have been
predominantly rejected by the courts. 69 It has been argued that negligent
placement in special education classes creates liability because of a mis-
feasance, rather than a nonfeasance. 70 The courts have nearly unani-
mously rejected this theory, clinging to the argument that even
educational malpractice in special education placement offends public
policy. 71 However, in one case liability was found for negligent misplace-
ment by invoking a medical malpractice theory. 72 In another jurisdiction,
a successful suit was brought for misclassification in special education
programs. In B.M. v. Montana,7 3 the Montana Supreme Court held that
"the state has a duty to use due care in placing students in special educa-
education and the local school boards, not the courts, are responsible for formulating the governing
policies of the educational process). See also Donohue, 391 N.E.2d at 1354; Ackerman, 231 N.Y.S.2d
at 114.
65. Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist. 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 825 (1976).
66. See, e.g., Peter W., 60 Cal. App. 3d at 824 (factors outside of the school's control that
subjectively affect the student include physical, neurological, emotional, cultural, and environmental
issues); Donohue v. Copiague Union Free Sch. Dist., 391 N.E.2d 1352, 1355. (N.Y. 1979) (Wachtler,
J., concurring) (a student's attitude, motivation, temperament, and home environment are all factors
that affect learning).
67. See, e.g., D.S.W. v. Fairbanks North Star Borough Sch. Dist., 628 P.2d 554, 556 (Alaska
1981); Hunter v. Board of Educ., 439 A.2d 582, 585 (Md. 1982).
68. See. e.g., D.S. W., 628 P.2d at 557; Hunter, 439 A.2d at 586 (the General Assembly has
provided a comprehensive process for reviewing placement decisions of handicapped children).
69. E.g., Hunter, 439 A.2d 582.
70. E.g., Hoffman v. Board of Educ., 400 N.E.2d 317, 320 (N.Y. 1979) (an argument was put
forth distinguishing a negligent failure to educate properly (nonfeasance) and an affirmative act that
resulted in the improper evaluation of a student's intellectual capacity (misfeasance)).
71. See, e.g., DeRosa v. City of New York, 132 A.D.2d 592, 593-94, (1987) (there was no
distinction between educational malpractice and educational negligence when a deaf child was diag-
nosed as mentally deficient due to a failure to perform any physical tests that would have revealed
the plaintiff's hearing loss); Hoffman, 400 N.E.2d at 320 (policy considerations apply with equal
force to educational malpractice suits based upon educational misfeasance and nonfeasance).
72. E.g., Snow v. New York, 98 A.D.2d 442, (1983) (negligent re-evaluation of the plaintiff's
intelligence level caused the plaintiff to remain institutionalized. Because the plaintiff was institution-
alized, the standard of care was that of the medical profession, and medical malpractice was found
for the negligent evaluation and treatment of the plaintiff).
73. B.M. v. Montana, 649 P.2d 425 (Mont. 1982).
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tion programs. ' 74 The state was liable for failing to follow the statutory
and regulatory policies of the state superintendent of public instruction.75
2. Judicial Interpretation of Statutory Education Standards
Even statutes guaranteeing "appropriate" education are not neces-
sarily sufficient to achieve the objective of allowing each student to de-
velop his or her potential. Judicial interpretation of the federal Education
of Handicapped Act (EHA)76 has reflected the reluctance of courts to
address quality of education. The EHA provides that all handicapped
children have a right to a free, appropriate education. 77 However, in
Board of Education v. Rowley,78 the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted an
"appropriate" education very narrowly. A review of the legislative his-
tory of the Act convinced the Court that the intent of the EHA was to
open the doors of public education to the more than 1.75 million handi-
capped children who were not receiving any educational benefit. 79 The
Court held that an "appropriate" education under the EHA was a guar-
antee of educational benefit,80 but not a guarantee of maximizing a
child's potential .8  The disparity between the actual academic achieve-
ment and the educational potential of the deaf plaintiff did not have to be
lessened by requiring the school district to provide a qualified sign-lan-
guage interpreter in the classroom.8 2 It was sufficient for the school dis-
trict to provide some tutoring and speech therapy as long as the plaintiff
was progressing in school.8 3
Even with state gifted statutes, gifted children generally have not
fared much better than the general education students in the courtroom.
In Ackerman v. Rubin,8 4 parents of a child who had reached 10.7 years of
age challenged the 11.3-year age requirement for admission into an accel-
erated junior high course of study.8 5 The court determined that the opin-
74. Id. at 426.
75. Id. at 427.
76. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (1988).
77. A "free appropriate public education" has been defined as one that meets an individual
education plan (IEP). See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(18) (1988). An IEP is developed by the local educa-
tional unit for each handicapped child. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(5) (1988).
78. 458 U.S. 175 (1982).
79. Id. at 192.
80. Id. at 201.
81. Id. at 199.
82. Id. at 210.
83. Id.
84. 231 N.Y.S.2d 112 (1962).
85. Ackerman, 231 N.Y.S.2d at 113. The board of education offered three different junior high
courses. Admittance into the accelerated and enriched programs required superior scholarship
grades. In addition, the accelerated program had a minimum age requirement. The plaintiff was
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ions and policies of the experienced educators were superior to the biased
opinion of the parents. 86 This was in spite of the fact that the child previ-
ously had been accelerated in school and was academically well qualified
for the program.8 7 Finding no evidence to negate the presumption of rea-
sonableness, the court upheld the school board's decision to require a
minimum age for acceptance into the accelerated program. 88
In New York, the state code provides that the state department of
education should assist local school districts in establishing programs for
gifted children. 89 This is an enabling statute, allowing the school districts
to meet the educational needs of the gifted students.90 It does not man-
date the development or establishment of gifted programs. 91 In 1984, a
New York school district offered both full-time and part-time gifted pro-
grams. The full-time program could only accommodate twenty-seven
gifted students. The part-time program was instituted to provide some
gifted education to the gifted students that could not be accepted in the
full-time gifted program. 92 In Bennett v. City School District of New
Rochelle,93 a qualified student challenged the exclusion from the full-time
gifted program when she was not one of the twenty-seven accepted stu-
dents. Since the statute made the establishment of gifted programs op-
tional, the court found in favor of the school board. 94 Establishing full-
time or part-time programs, determining the nature and type of pro-
grams, and defining the size and population of the programs are decisions
left to the discretion of the local school district. 95 Again, a court refused
to use the judicial system to test the validity of educational decisions in
the absence of public policy violations.96
Even when gifted education is mandated by statute, a school district
is still likely to be given considerable deference for the programs that are
offered to the students. For example, in Pennsylvania, where gifted stu-
accepted in the three year course, which offered an enriched curriculum. He was denied admittance
into the two year accelerated program due to his age.
86. Id. at 113.
87. Id. at 113.
88. Id. at 115.
89. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 4451 (McKinney Supp. 1990) ("Subject to the availability of funds, the
state education department is hereby authorized and empowered to assist districts in meeting the
educational needs of gifted pupils...").
90. Bennett v. City Sch. Dist., 497 N.Y.S.2d 72, 76 (1985).
91. Id. at 76.
92. Id. at 75, (Plaintiff was one of 109 students qualified for 27 openings in the program. Stu-
dents were selected for the full-time gifted program via a lottery; those not selected participated in a
part-time TAG program).
93. 497 N.Y.S.2d 72 (1985).
94. Id. at 80.
95. Id. at 76.
96. Id. at 78.
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dents are one classification of exceptional students,97 this classification
entitles gifted students to an individual education plan (IEP). 98 In Scott v.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Education,99 the parents
of a gifted student challenged an IEP that did not include math instruc-
tion for their mathematically gifted son. Following administrative proce-
dures outlined in the statute, t°° the parents challenged the IEP. The IEP
recommended by a hearing officer was then challenged by the local
school district, 01 and subsequently overruled by the secretary of educa-
tion. Ultimately, the school district's IEP for the plaintiff was upheld by
the civil courts because of a statutory provision10 2 providing that in the
absence of an agreement between the school district and the parents, the
final authority for determining an appropriate education rests with the
state department of education.103 The Pennsylvania court confirmed the
secretary of state's decision to uphold the school district's IEP for the
plaintiff because of statutory requirements that required deference to the
secretary of state's decision.104 The school district was not required to
develop an educational program that maximizes the student's abilities,
when the plaintiff had already completed the school district's most ad-
vanced mathematics course.105
Centennial School District v. Department of Education 106 is another
case in which the local school district challenged an IEP that was recom-
mended by a hearing officer. However, in this case, the hearing officer's
recommended IEP was confirmed by the secretary of education. 0 7 The
secretary of state ruled that an enrichment program did not relieve the
district of its duty to provide an appropriate education that meets the
97. 22 PA. CODE § 13.1 (1989) (exceptional children are defined as school-age persons who
deviate from the average, either physically, mentally, emotionally, or socially. This classification
includes handicapped children, gifted and talented children, and children placed in detention
homes).
98. 22 PA. CODE § 13.1 (1989) (exceptional school-aged persons are entitled to an appropriate
educational program that meets their individual needs).
99. 512 A.2d 790 (Pa. 1986).
100. 22 PA. CODE § 13.33 (1989).
101. Scott S. v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Educ., 512 A.2d 790, 792 (Pa. 1986).
102. 22 PA. CODE § 13.1 (1989) (the statute provides for appeals to the secretary of education).
103. Scott S., 512 A.2d at 793.
104. Id. at 792 n. I (citing Centennial Sch. Dist. v. Dep't of Educ. 503 A.2d 1090 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1986) (when a suit is subsequently filed in civil court, the court must defer to the decision of the
secretary of education unless there has been a violation of constitutional rights, an error of law, or
lack of evidence to support the finding)).
105. Id. at 792 (citing Centennial Sch. Dist. v. Dep't of Educ. 503 A.2d 1090 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1986)).
106. 539 A.2d 785 (Pa. 1988).
107. Centennial, 539 A.2d at 790 (as the result of a due process hearing, the hearing officer's
recommendation regarding the plaintiffs individual education plan (IEP) included individualized
instruction, in addition to the enrichment program offered by the school district).
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needs of individual students. 108 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recog-
nized the statutory authority of the state board of education to define and
regulate education of gifted students. 10 9 The state board of education
found that an enrichment program for gifted children was not enough to
meet an individual student's educational need. ' 0 Since the state board
required individualized education, the student's IEP that required spe-
cialized instruction in mathematics and reading, in addition to the en-
richment program, was lawful.' 
In Scott, the secretary of state did not require the school district to
provide accelerated mathematics to a high school senior beyond what
was legally required for the curriculum." 12 In Centennial, the secretary of
state required modification of a required curriculum to meet the educa-
tional needs of a second grade student.' 1 3 Essentially, the issue raised by
challenging a gifted curriculum is how far a school district must go to
meet the needs of the gifted student. In Pennsylvania, the existent curric-
ulum must be stretched around the student in an attempt to meet his or
her needs, but the curriculum does not have to be expanded to meet
those needs. Both of these Pennsylvania cases illustrate judicial deference
to decisions made by education authorities in the administrative appeals
process. In both cases, the court upheld the administrative rulings. Ulti-
mately, the court does not interpret the educational standard, but rather
reviews the administrative process for compliance with the statute.
Currently, gifted statutes and judicial decisions are not enough to
adequately address the educational requirements of the gifted students.
The issue in the general educational malpractice suits is the failure to
adequately educate the student."I4 That is, the student graduates with an
education that falls short of the minimal education that should have been
acquired." 5 The results of educational malpractice suits primarily have
been to defer to the educational policy decisions made by the school sys-
tem. The judicial system has been reluctant to broadly interpret state
statutes and state constitutional provisions to include more than a right
to attend a classroom." 6 The reluctance of the courts to address the issue
108. Centennial, 539 A.2d at 790.
109. Id. at 788-89.
110. Id. at 787.
111. Id. at 791.
112. See supra text accompanying notes 99-105.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 106-11.
114. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
115. See cases cited supra note 55.
116. See, e.g., Bennett v. City Sch. Dist., 497 N.Y.S.2d 72, 79 (1985) The New York constitution
intended to assure "minimal acceptable facilities and services" under the clause that provides for the
-maintenance and support of a system of free common schools." N.Y. CONST., art. XI, § 1.
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of quality of education can be attributed to statutes that inadequately
address the quality of education. Even if the judicial system were to ac-
cept educational malpractice as a cause of action, in the absence of spe-
cific statutory language, it is unlikely that the court's interpretation of an
educational standard would be broadened to the point that the max-
imization of the student's potential would be guaranteed.
In addition, the educational malpractice environment generally in-
volves bringing suit against one school teacher or administrator. But the
lack of quality education for gifted children is not caused by individual
school teachers or limited to any one school district. It is the result of an
entire educational system that has failed to address the quality of educa-
tion provided to the students.
Also, most educational malpractice cases are brought to recover
damages, such as the tutoring costs incurred to bring the child to a mini-
mal level of education. 117 An adequate solution for gifted students must
address the educational needs of the student when currently enrolled, not
after dropping out or underachieving for twelve years in an inappropriate
educational program. The solution for a gifted child is to provide an ade-
quately challenging education, not money damages. The source of the
solution will be a statute that specifically addresses educational needs and
provides procedural safeguards that allow parental intervention in the
educational process before irreparable damage occurs.
II. REASON FOR FEDERAL INTERVENTION
A. Federal Interest in Education
Although educational policy is primarily a state function,' 1 8 the fed-
eral Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA)t1 9 demonstrates the tre-
mendous impact that can be effected by enactment of a federal
educational statute. This statute addressed the federal government's con-
cern for children whose disabilities prevented them from having a suc-
cessful educational experience within the public school system. 120 Before
the enactment of the EHA, estimates indicated that up to one million
handicapped children were receiving no education at all while another
117. Doe v. Board of Educ., A.2d 814, 817 (Md. 1982) (the plaintiff's parents expended vast
sums of money for private education, evaluations, counseling and rehabilitation).
118. U.S. CONsT. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitu-
tion, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.")
Since the Constitution does not provide for education as a federal power, it is considered to be a
power reserved to the state under the tenth amendment.
119. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (1988).
120. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (1988) ("the special educational needs of such [handicapped] children
are not being fully met")
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four million handicapped children were not receiving an appropriate edu-
cation. 12 1 In order to receive federal funds for education of the handi-
capped, a state must have a program that assures a free, appropriate, 22
public education to all handicapped children.' 21 Under the EHA, the
school system is required to evaluate each child and to determine an indi-
vidual education program (IEP). t24 An IEP includes the child's current
level of educational performance, short-term objectives listed within an
annual educational plan, and a statement of the specific educational serv-
ices to be provided. t25
The EHA also guarantees procedural safeguards to protect disabled
children from actions of the school district that parents may not believe
are in the child's best interest. 1 26 The procedural safeguards provide that
parents or guardians may be involved in all phases of their child's educa-
tion. The parents or guardians are entitled to examine all records rele-
vant to their child's identification, evaluation, or placement,127 to present
complaints regarding the identification and placement of the child, 28 to
attend the meetings where the IEP for their child is developed, 29 and to
propose or oppose any changes in their child's placement. 30
When there are disagreements between the school system and the
parents or guardians, the parents or guardians have the right to a due
process hearing, as determined by state law.13 ' If the hearing is con-
ducted by a local or intermediate educational unit, the decision can be
reviewed by the state educational agency.' 32 Either party, having ex-
hausted the administrative appeal process without reaching a satisfactory
ruling, has a right to bring a civil action in either the state or federal
court system.' 33 The court tries the case based on the evidence
presented 34 in order to determine whether the state has complied with
the procedures set forth in the act and whether the IEP enables the child
121. ROSEMARY C. SALOME, EQUAL EDUCATION UNDER LAW 137-38 (1986).
122. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1) (1988) (An appropriate education is defined as special education and
related services that meet the standards of the state educational agency and conform to the individu-
alized education program that the EHA requires).
123. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1) (1988).
124. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(5) (1988).
125. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(19) (1988).
126. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1988).
127. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(A) (1988).
128. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(E) (1988).
129. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(19) (1988).
130. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(C) (1988).
131. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(2) (1988).
132. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(c) (1988).
133. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1988).
134. Id.
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to receive educational benefit. 135 The parents' ability to take their case to
court is an important factor in dispute resolution at the administrative
level.' 36 It is the parents' involvement in the development and mainte-
nance of the child's education that affords the child protection from the
state and local educational agencies. 37 The conditions that the EHA at-
tached to the funding, especially the right to an IEP and due process
hearings, indicate the Congressional concern with the reluctance of the
state to adequately address the educational needs of the handicapped. 38
Although in 1969 Congress began to recognize the importance of
legislation for the education of gifted children, 39 the federal TAG Act' 4°
lacks the substance of the EHA. 141 Instead of providing for a substantive
right to a specific type or level of education, 42 the TAG Act merely
provides technical assistance and limited funding. 43 The funds are pro-
vided to state agencies for TAG personnel development and establish-
ment of programs that identify and educate gifted children. 44 Even
though Congress recognized that gifted children are a vital national re-
source critical to the future of the nation, 45 the TAG Act does not ad-
dress any specific gifted education issues or mandate delivery of services
related to individual gifted children. 146 Compared to the EHA, the fed-
eral TAG Act is notably limited in scope. Congress feared that the spe-
135. Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 204-07 (1982).
136. SALOME, supra note 121, at 155. See also, Zirkel & Stevens, supra note 9, at 362 (in Penn-
sylvania, only four of nineteen special educational appeals decided by the secretary of education were
appealed in court).
137. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 208.
138. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (1988) (one million handicapped children were entirely excluded from
the public school system, and many children who did attend the schools were prevented from a
successful educational experience because of their handicap).
139. S. REP. No. 222, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 1988 reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 101, 135 ("In light
of our concern that we strengthen our trade position, it is particularly important that we identify all
such students and provide them with instruction that will challenge them to the full limits of their
potential").
140. 20 U.S.C. §§ 3061-68.
141. GOLDBERG, supra note 6, at 114 (a significant difference between the EHA and the TAG
Act is that the EHA is a civil rights law, while the TAG Act is a grant program); Zirkel & Stevens,
supra note 9, at 366 (the federal statute is largely a symbolic recognition).
142. 20 U.S.C. § 3064(b) (1988) (funds can be used for personnel training, establishing model
projects for the identification and education of TAG children, strengthening the state educational
agencies in providing programs to local school districts, and developing programs to disseminate
information.)
143. S. REP. No. 297, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 1988 reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 101, 135 (districts
spent an average of $1,000 on TAG programs).
144. 20 U.S.C. § 3064(a) (1988) (after a state organization submits an application for a program
designed to meet the educational needs of TAG students, the federal government contracts with the
state and assists with the funding of the program.)
145. 20 U.S.C. § 3062 (1988) ("The Congress finds and declares that - (1) gifted and talented
students are a national resource vital to the future of the Nation and its security and well-being.")
146. Zirkel & Stevens, supra note 9, at 354.
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cial potential of gifted children to contribute to the national interest
would be lost unless state and local agencies provided educational serv-
ices and programs that are appropriate to the needs of gifted children.1 47
The lack of substance of the TAG Act, when compared to the EHA,
indicates Congress' preference to allow the states to address educational
issues initially. However, a review of the state gifted statutory provisions
indicate that now it is time for a more substantive federal TAG Act.
Although many state codes reflect the federal intent to provide an
appropriate public education to gifted children, 148 the current state statu-
tory provisions for gifted education inadequately further the federal goal
of ensuring that education fully develops the potential of gifted chil-
dren. 1 49 Less than half of the estimated three million gifted school-age
children are participating in public school gifted programs. 150 Gifted pro-
grams are still optional in some states,' 5 ' and there is a wide variety of
programs that are offered in various states, some more extensive than
others. 52 Only seventeen states offer individual education plans or the
due process safeguards. 5 3 Even if the state does provide these safe-
guards, it is not a guarantee of an adequately challenging education. In
the only significant court interpretation of a gifted statute, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court ruled that the school district did not have to
"maximize" a gifted student's capabilities. ' 5 4 This limiting of the re-
quired programs to those currently within the district's present curricu-
lum substantially narrowed the benefits to which a gifted student was
entitled. 55
Gifted benefits were also reduced during the 1980s, when there was
a federal retreat from investment in the public schools. 156 Funds for
twenty-nine discretionary programs were consolidated into one block
147. 20 U.S.C. § 3062(a)(2) (1988) (unless recognized and developed, the special potential of
TAG children to contribute to the national interest is likely to be lost).
148. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
149. Stencel, supra note 40, at 125 (estimates are that three-fourths of potentially gifted students
do not reach their academic capability).
150. Zirkel & Stevens, supra note 9, at 353. See also Stencel, supra note 40, at 119 (only twelve
percent of gifted students receive all of the educational services that they require).
151. Ronald G. Marquardt & Frances A. Cames, The Courts and Gifted Education, 50 EDUC.
LAW REP. 9 (1989) (mandatory legislation exists in only half of the states).
152. See supra notes 27-39 and accompanying text.
153. Zirkel & Stevens, supra note 9, at 355.
154. Centennial School Dist. v. Dep't of Educ., 539 A.2d 785, 791 (Pa. 1988).
155. Id. The school district in this case provided an enrichment program for gifted students. The
plaintiff's IEP required accelerated course work in an age-appropriate setting. Id. at 786. While
stating that a school district did not have to go beyond existing curricular offerings, the court held
that a student's need for acceleration could not be ignored merely because the school district offered
an enrichment program. Id. at 791.
156. SALOME, supra note 121, at 169.
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grant.157 This was intended to improve education, reduce administration
and vest program responsibility in local school districts.' 58 One of the
results of this retreat was to decrease federal funding of several major
programs, with a disproportionate burden falling on urban areas.' 5 9 An-
other undesirable consequence of the consolidation was that the funds
were not distributed in accordance with the national objectives embodied
in the programs.'60 In 1981, many gifted students lost their specific edu-
cational programs when the appropriated funds were rolled into the
Chapter 2 education block grant.' 61 At the same time, state funding
structures, attempting to equalize the spending in property rich and
property poor school districts, failed to target additional funds to specific
student populations within the district based on need.1 62 In addition, a
generally conservative Supreme Court had caused a shift in educational
policy from an emphasis on the role and importance of education to the
importance of discipline and authority.' 63 These legislative and judicial
trends reduce the likelihood that gifted students will receive the educa-
tional benefits needed to realize their potential.
Studies have indicated that education in the United States is in a
state of crisis. 64 At a time when many cry out for reform 65 and account-
ability, 166 the local school districts are responding to local pressures re-
157. Id. at 176-77.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 172. Urban school districts, normally with a higher percentage of disadvantaged and
handicapped students, rely heavily on federal funds to assist them with the high-costs of educating
those students with special needs.
160. Id. at 176-77. See also, LYNNE SAMETZ & CAREN S. McLoUGHLIN, EDUCATORS, CHIL-
DREN AND THE LAW, 16 (1985) (if the program for education of handicapped children were consoli-
dated into a block grant, the procedural guidelines required by EHA would be lost).
161. Zirkel & Stevens, supra note 9, at 354 (gifted funding was consolidated with the funds of
twenty-eight other programs).
162. SALOME, supra note 121, at 173-75. This type of funding burdens those categories of stu-
dents with a higher per pupil cost of education. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 16-39-3 (1987) (in Alabama,
if funds for the education of exceptional children impair the classes and services offered to nonexcep-
tional children, then all funds are prorated on a per capita basis); Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No.
I v. Montana, 769 P.2d 684, 688 (Mont. 1989) (many poor school districts did not offer a Gifted and
Talented Program).
163. See, Ronald T. Hyman, Educ. Beliefs of Supreme Court Justices in the 1980's, 59 EDUC.
LAW REP. 285, 294 (1990).
164. Robert J. Goodwin, The Crisis in Public Education and a Constitutional Rationale for Fed-
eral Intervention, 1988 DET. C.L. REV. 937 (citing NATIONAL COMMISSION ON EXCELLENCE IN
EDUCATION, A NATION AT RISK: THE IMPERATIVE FOR EDUCATIONAL REFORM 5-7 (1983)). See
also Tom Morganthau, Brainpower, NEWSWEEK, December 31, 1990 at 34-35 (the continuous ac-
ceptance of mediocrity in the schools poses a large and growing risk to America's economic
competitiveness).
165. See, e.g., Morganthau, supra note 164, at 34-35 (quoting Colorado Governor Romer, "This
nation ... must [push forward with reform] if it's going to stay economically competitive"); Tom
Morganthau, The Future is Now, NEWSWEEK, Fall/Winter 1990 at 72 (governors, legislators, CEOs
of major U.S. corporations are asking for decisive action on education reform).
166. Tom Morganthau, The Future is Now, NEWSWEEK, Fall/Winter 1990 at 72, 73-74 (it is
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garding curriculum. 167 In some cases, this has resulted in fewer funds
devoted to the educational curriculum. 168 Unfortunately, whenever there
are budget cuts and other belt-tightening measures, special programs are
normally the first to be eliminated. Several states are already proposing
to cut back their gifted programs,1 69 while some local school districts
have already done so. 170
However, failure to meet the educational needs of the gifted students
is a serious omission. The deletion and reduction of gifted programs are
"justified" in several ways. These include the presumption that gifted
children will learn by themselves,1 71 the fear that labeling children as
gifted has a detrimental effect on other children, 172 and a concern about
providing some benefit, such as better instruction or better instructors, to
one class of students that is not available to all students.1 73
These concerns, however, should not justify inadequate educational
opportunities for gifted students. First of all, the common perception that
bright students do not need special education because they learn auto-
matically is false. In fact, these students will not reach their full potential
without some attention to, and investment in, their unique educational
needs.174 Fulfillment of these needs requires acceleration, 175 enrich-
generally accepted that the best way of evaluating the quality of schools is to measure the result.
Then successes and failures of the system must be reported back to the policymakers. Accountability
helps the policymakers determine what teaching methods are working and which ones should be
eliminated).
167. Goodwin, supra note 164, at 949 n.59 (citing E.D. HIRSCH, CULTURAL LITERACY 20
(1987) (in 1894, high schools offered 40 different subjects. Sixty years later, 274 subjects were offered
to high school students)).
168. Id. at 949 n.54 (citing WILLIAM BENNETT, AMERICAN EDUCATION: MAKING IT WORK 46
(1988) (former Secretary of Education noted that a smaller share of the school dollar was being spent
on classroom instruction that at any other time in recent history)).
169. Renee Loth, Two-Edged Budget Dilemma For State, BOSTON GLOBE, July 29, 1990 at 20
(part of the solution for the fiscal crisis was to cut back programs for gifted students); Rick Pluta,
House Approves School Aid Spending That Would Limit Retirement Payments, UNITED PRESS IN-
TERNATIONAL, May 21, 1990 (Michigan's House of Representatives approved a $700 million school
aid bill that included the elimination of some funds earmarked for gifted and talented education);
Laurie J. Storey, Gifted Student Programs Among Those Facing Cuts, BOSTON GLOBE, March 11,
1990 at 7 (budget cuts in New Hampshire threaten the gifted and talented programs).
170. Casey Banas, Students Tell How Poor Schools Hurt Them, CHI. TRIB., March 15, 1991 at 2
(deficiencies in Illinois schools caused by funding problems include eliminating honors courses for
college-bound students and gifted and remedial summer school programs).
171. Sorenson, supra note 4, at 1.
172. David G. Myers, The Dangers of "Gifted" Education, CHI. TRIB., March 5, 1991 at 13.
(labeling gifted children causes other students to feel mediocre).
173. Id. (gifted education segregates the advantaged from the less advantaged, the elite from the
non-elite).
174. One author fears the danger that imagination and ambition can be "educated" out of a
TAG student, causing harm to the student and society. Fund for the Advancement of Education,
supra note 4, at 160.
175. Stencel, supra note 40, at 125 (acceleration is moving a rapid learner through the grades
based on interest and ability, not age).
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ment 176 or a combination of both. Also, many gifted students have other
special needs that must be addressed in order to tap their learning poten-
tial. 177 Giftedness is a natural resource that must be nurtured to be
reaped.
However, to reap its benefits, giftedness must first be identified. A
necessary by-product of identification is a label to recognize what has
been distinguished. The risks of abusing and of misunderstanding labels,
such as "gifted," are insufficient reasons to totally avoid them. Determin-
ing that a child is "gifted" in math, does not suggest that the child is
"ungifted" in reading with inadequate reading skills. It simply proposes
that the child has a special talent in math, and identifies the fact that this
academic area may need some special attention in order to fully develop.
Just as students are labeled "first graders," "dyslexic," or "mentally re-
tarded" so that the education can be focused on the needs of the group,
some students are labeled as "gifted" for the same purpose. As imperfect
as labels may be, the alternative to avoiding the labels is not desirable
either. Too often, ignoring the educational needs of gifted students re-
sults in students that underachieve academically or completely drop out
of school. 178
Finally, the concern about providing some benefit to one class of
students, such as better instruction or better instructors, must be consid-
ered. Critics of gifted education fear that. gifted courses create an elite
group by segregating the advantaged from the less advantaged. 179 Yet,
total segregation of gifted students is not always necessary. Acceleration
can be accomplished within the school curriculum, without any addi-
tional cost, by simply relaxing age related requirements. In these situa-
tions, gifted students receive the same instruction from the same
instructors. But even when segregation is necessary, for example for the
provision of enrichment programs, the segregation does not create an
elite group. Gifted children include rich and poor, black and white, and
healthy and physically disabled children. 80 The failure of our society to
176. Enrichment keeps a student in an age-level class. In addition to the regular curriculum,
programs are offered that provide additional learning experiences, such as in-depth exploration of a
subject. See, id.
177. Karen M. Thomas, Teacher Helps Refine Inner-City Students Unique Gifts, CHI. TRIB.,
February 4, 1991, at I (Gifted children with poor economic backgrounds or with major gaps in their
personal lives oftentimes need remedial work first, because they haven't learned to read. However,
once placed in appropriate programs, their significant potential can be tapped).
178. See, e.g., Stencel, supra note 40, at 124 (mounting evidence indicates that bright students do
not necessarily thrive without special attention); S. REP. No. 222, supra note 139, at 135 ("[Mlany
[gifted students], offered an unchallenging curriculum [sic] and unaware of their educational talent,
drop out of school.").
179. Meyers, supra note 172.
180. For an excellent tale of a teacher's diligence in working with a gifted student who was
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meet the needs of all gifted students t ' creates a class of elite gifted,
drawn from the ranks of the affluent, because only the affluent elite have
the means to develop to their potential by seeking private education
when the public education system fails to meet their needs.18 2 When the
public education system meets the educational needs of all gifted stu-
dents, then the opportunity to excel will not be limited to the affluent
elite, but all gifted students from every background will have an opportu-
nity to excel.
Maintenance of gifted programs is critical when considering the po-
tential contribution of gifted students to society.' 8 3 As the twenty-first
century approaches, global problems in need of global solutions are nu-
merous. For example, these problems encompass environmental, 184 med-
ical 85 and economical issues.' 8 6 However, academically, U.S. students
seriously lag behind students in other countries.'8 7 Changes in teaching
methods, especially for gifted students, must be initiated to eliminate this
educational gap.'18 8 Because of the potential contribution to society of
gifted students, several authors believe that a federal mandate for gifted
education should be a top priority. 189 To be effective, a gifted curriculum
must be systematic and continuous.' 90 Current optional state TAG stat-
stubborn, brilliant, severely disabled, and a product of a low-income single parent household, see
VAIL, supra note 42, at 31-35.
181. Stencel, supra note 40, at 134 (inner-city school officials rarely identify gifted students or
establish gifted programs).
182. A school for gifted children located in Illinois charges $5,500 per year tuition. THE AVERY
COONLEY SCHOOL, ADMISSIONS INQUIRY CARD.
183. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 297, 100th Cong. 2d Sess., reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 101, 135.
(the future of the country rests largely in the hands of talented and gifted children); Stencel, supra
note 40, at 135 (without gifted programs, the country risks shortchanging the development of to-
morrow's leadership).
184. Jerry Adler, Survival, NEWSWEEK, December 31, 1990 at 30, 33 (the global environment is
attacked underground by radioactive wastes and is threatened by holes in the ozone shield in the sky.
Other global environmental problems include developing clean air and water standards, disposing
toxic-waste products, and protecting wild-life habitat).
185. For example, AIDS research must be continued until a cure is found.
186. See, e.g., Robert S. Samuelson, Debt, NEWSWEEK, December 31, 1990 at 23 (the U.S. debt
problem could trigger a global recession); Sorenson, supra note 4, at 2 (the transition in the U.S.
from an industrial to a high technology society places the U.S. in "worldwide intellectual competi-
tion for economic survival.").
187. Morganthau, supra note 166, at 72 (American high-school seniors' math and science test
scores are much lower than the scores of their counterparts in almost every other industrialized
nation).
188. Id. at 74.
189. See, e.g., Marquardt & Carnes, supra note 151, at 14; Sorenson, supra note 4, at 2 ("The
need for helping gifted students has never been stronger than it is today."); Stencel, supra note 40, at
135 (lack of support for gifted education is a risk that Americans cannot afford to take).
190. Stencel, supra note 40, at 132 (the lack of systematic and suitable curriculum delays the
educational advancement of the gifted student).
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utes do not provide this continuity,191 and the federal TAG Act is inef-
fective as well. Since the programs have been predominantly written at
the local school district level, the programs are likely to be inconsistent
even within a state.
The judiciary's reluctance to intervene in state educational policy,
especially in the absence of federal and state legislation, has left many
gifted students without a remedy when pursuit of an education appropri-
ate to their needs is futile.1 92 Experience with the education of disadvan-
taged and handicapped students indicates that little will be done for the
education of gifted students until the federal government stimulates the
action. 193 Some believe that federal leadership and direction is necessary
to bring about any meaningful reform in the education system, because
the current condition of education is a crisis.194 Relief for gifted students
will have to come from a statute that directly addresses their needs. Since
the inconsistent state gifted education statutes do not substantially fur-
ther the federal interest in gifted education, a federal TAG statute must
be adopted.
B. Constitutionality of a Federal TAG Statute
Since the government's obligation to provide education to the popu-
lation is not specifically stated in the U.S. Constitution, the authority to
provide education rests with the states.195 However, the federal govern-
ment has created educational policies under the general welfare clause of
the constitution. 196 When Congress passes any statute, it must have the
authority to act 197 and the statute cannot violate the U.S. Constitution.
This section will examine the authority for the proposed federal TAG
Act and the constitutionality of the Act under the due process clause of
191. Thomas, supra note 177 (the gifted program developed by one teacher ended when that
teacher was transferred to another school).
192. See supra notes 84-105 and accompanying text.
193. Stencel, supra note 40, at 132.
194. See, e.g., Goodwin, supra note 164, at 938, 950 ("IT]he existing crisis in public education
provides legal justification for the removal of critical public school curriculum decisions from local
control and for the implementation of a mandatory national policy on curriculum and related mat-
ters." Sixteen thousand school administrators facing sixteen thousand constituencies have not been
able to achieve meaningful curriculum reform); Morganthau, supra note 166, at 74 (quoting Ernest
Boyer, president of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, "83,000 schools,
acting on their own, will not make this a competitive nation.").
195. U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people).
196. NEWTON EDWARDS, THE COURTS AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, 2 (1971) (the federal gov-
ernment has enacted educational legislation through the years, even though the extent and limit of
the authority has never been clearly defined).
197. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (the federal government is a government of dele-
gated powers).
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the Fifth Amendment. This section will also generally consider the state
constitutionality of acceptance of federal funds under the proposed Act.
1. Federal Authority to Intervene and the Constitutionality of
Federal Intervention in Education
Since Congress does not have any express constitutional authority to
support and control education, the authority for federal educational leg-
islation has been found in the general welfare clause of the Constitu-
tion.198 It is not disputed that Congress has the authority to make
reasonable appropriations for the support of education.199 It is the fed-
eral control of education through the general welfare clause that is lim-
ited. Congress' spending power cannot be used to purchase state
conformity to a policy that is strictly within an area of state jurisdic-
tion.2°° But, if a nationwide social need is presented, Congress can induce
states to cooperate with the federal government to meet the need.201
Since states generally have accepted federal intervention attached to
federal grants, the federal government exerts a powerful influence in state
educational systems through the provisions that accompany federal fund-
ing. 20 2 Since education is a matter of national concern, Congress can
collaborate with the states to promote education, without acting outside
the scope of the general welfare clause.20 3 For example, the Education of
the Handicapped Act (EHA) is permissible because of the national need
to address the educational needs of handicapped children. 2° 4 A federal
statute for gifted education would be very similar to the Education of the
Handicapped Act. The purpose of both statutes is to assist the states in
promoting education of a group of students with unique needs. There-
fore, the authority for the proposed federal TAG Act likewise can be
grounded in the general welfare clause.
The proposed federal TAG Act classifies a segment of the student
population and confers benefits that are not available to other students.
Opponents of the statute may argue that this is a violation of the equal
198. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 ("The Congress shall have the power to lay and collect taxes,
... to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States").
199. EDWARDS, supra note 196, at 4.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 5.
202. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 1989, 148
(1989) (for the 1986-87 school year, federal funds were almost 6.5% of all school revenues. Eleven
states received over 10% of their revenue from federal sources).
203. EDWARDS, supra note 196, at 5.
204. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(b)(9) (1988) ("It is in the national interest that the Federal Government
assist State and local efforts to provide programs to meet the educational needs of handicapped
children . . .").
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protection component of the Fifth Amendment's due process clause.205
Generally, a statute violates equal protection if it denies equal treatment
to a class of persons without a rational basis.20 6 If, however, the classifi-
cation is a suspect classification, 20 7 or restricts the exercise of a funda-
mental right to a specific group, 20 8 then the state must have a compelling
reason for the classification, in order to be in compliance with the equal
protection clause.
The proposed TAG Act classifies students based on capability,
which is not a suspect classification, 20 9 for educational benefit, which is
not a fundamental right.210 Absent a suspect class or invasion of a funda-
205. U.S. CONST. amend. V (... nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law).
206. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-2, at 1441 (1988)
207. See, e.g., Marcia Pearce Burgdorf & Robert Burgdorf, A History of Unequal Treatment: The
Qualifications of Handicapped Persons as a "Suspect Class" Under the Equal Protection Clause, 15
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 855, 903 (1975) (a suspect classification is normally only found when the
classification is based on race, nationality or alienage, sex, handicap, or age and the classification has
no rational relationship to the goal of the statute); TRIBE, supra note 206, § 16-33, at 1614-15 (the
courts will usually find a suspect classification if it involves a discrete and insular minority, or the
classification indicates a stereotype or stigma).
208. TRIBE, supra note 206, § 16-7 (of particular concern are the fundamental rights related to
voting, litigating and exercising intimate personal choices).
209. Given that the proposed statute does not create a suspect class or invade a fundamental
right, the statute will survive an equal protection challenge if the classification it creates has a ra-
tional basis. Clearly, the act exceeds that standard. The federal Education of the Handicapped Act
(EHA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400-85 (1988), is an example of creating a classification in order to provide
more benefits for some than for others. When persons are situated so that equal treatment causes
unequal governmental protection, the legislative branch is obligated to create classifications. Most of
the legislative effort involves classification in order to better serve the public interest. TRIBE, Supra
note 206, § 16-1, at 1437-38. For example, if all voters were required to come to the polls to vote,
regardless of their physical capacity to do so, the legislative branch would be required to classify this
group of individuals so that their right to vote was protected. See id. Usually, the legislative classifi-
cation is presumed to be constitutional if the government has a rational purpose for the legislation
and the classification is reasonably legitimate in relation to the stated purpose. See, e.g., Glen E.
Thurow, The Declaration of Independence and the Equal Protection of the Laws, in STILL THE LAW
OF THE LAND 121 (Joseph S. McNamara & Lissa Roche, eds. 1988); TRIBE, supra note 206, § 16-2,
at 1440. The proposed federal TAG Act is attempting to relax some state educational restrictions
and to improve the level of public education for students identified as talented or gifted, benefits that
are not available for all students. However, gifted students would not be considered a suspect classifi-
cation because the classification is not based on race, age or other suspect classifications. See supra
note 207. Even if the identification process for gifted education resulted in a disproportionate exclu-
sion of minority students, the statute could still be held to be constitutional. The statute is neutral on
its face, and serves a purpose for which the government is authorized to act. To be found unconstitu-
tional, there must be evidence that the government acted with an intent to discriminate. See, e.g.
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246 (1976). The classification is based on a need for an ade-
quately challenging education. This classification is reasonably related to the legitimate purpose of
improving the education of gifted students. In the absence of a suspect classification, the statute will
not be subject to strict scrutiny since education is not a fundamental right afforded explicit constitu-
tional protection. See San Antonio Independent Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
Therefore, the proposed TAG Act would be constitutional, because the classification has a rational
basis for furthering the purpose of the state to provide an adequately challenging education for gifted
students.
210. At one point, many commentators thought that education might be viewed as a fundamen-
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mental right or privilege, the government clearly can demonstrate a ra-
tional reason for the classification, specifically, to provide a level of
education that better meets the needs of the students in order to obtain
the full capability of their contribution to society. Therefore, the statute
should meet any equal protection challenge.
Since the suggested federal TAG Act is proposed under the general
welfare clause, acceptance of funds by each state would be voluntary. 211
If a state agrees to accept funds provided under the proposed TAG Act,
then it is bound by the terms of the statute. 212 Each state may accept the
funds as long as the terms of the statute do not violate the state constitu-
tion. 213 Since the terms of state constitutions can be more restrictive than
the federal Constitution, the proposed TAG Act could be in compliance
with the federal Constitution and in violation of a state constitution si-
multaneously. 214 Therefore, acceptance of federal funds under the pro-
posed TAG Act may be subject to state constitutional restrictions.
2. The State Constitutional Challenge
Public schools are funded by local, state and federal funds. A poten-
tal right, based on the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
The Supreme Court ruled that "separate but equal" facilities in the public school systems were not
allowed. Although some state constitutions required racial segregation, the Brown Court found that
segregation had no place in the public school system. Recognizing the role of education as critical to
the realization of success in life, the Brown court stated that when the state undertakes the provision
of education, the education provided becomes "a right which must be made available to all on equal
terms." Next, the Court reasoned that when segregation was sanctioned by the law, Afro-American
children developed a sense of inferiority that affected their motivation to learn. Thus, state sanc-
tioned segregation deprived Afro-American children of some of the benefits they would receive in an
integrated school system by causing an adverse affect on the child's motivation to learn. Although
not a total deprivation, since the segregated schools provided some educational benefits, this depriva-
tion was a violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, after
Brown, it was presumed that education was a constitutionally protected fundamental right. Only
twenty years later, however, the Supreme Court clarified its position on the right to educational
benefit. In San Antonio Independent Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), the Court expressly
refused to recognize education as a constitutionally protected fundamental right or liberty. The court
reasoned that in the absence of a suspect classification, an educational system does not violate the
equal protection clause when the system provides each child with an opportunity to acquire the basic
minimal skills necessary to enjoy the rights of speech and full participation in the political process.
So, the Court limited Brown to a rule invalidating suspect racial classifications in education and held
there was no constitutional right to a specific level of education.
211. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) ("[L]egislation enacted
pursuant to the spending power is much in the nature of a contract: in return for federal funds, the
States agree to comply with federally imposed conditions.").
212. Id. (the state agrees to comply with federally imposed conditions when the federal funds are
accepted).
213. Wheeler v. Barrera, 417 U.S. 402, 417 n. 13 (1974) (Congress had no intention that state
acceptance of federal Title I funds would pre-empt state constitutional spending restrictions.).
214. Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 864 (W. Va. 1979) (a state constitution can be interpreted




tial state constitutional challenge for the proposed federal TAG Act
could be the funding of gifted education. Lawsuits have been filed in
some states challenging particular means of financing education as being
unconstitutional because some students receive more funds than others.
Challenges to the methods of funding education have claimed unconsti-
tutional failure to provide an efficient school system,215 failure to imple-
ment a basic program of education, 216 failure to provide equal
educational opportunity,21 7 violation of equal protection 218 and violation
of uniform taxation. 21 9
For example, the Texas Supreme Court has held that when the state
depends heavily on local property taxes, the taxes must be levied on
property at a substantially similar rate, in order to fulfill that state's con-
stitutional mandate of providing an efficient system.220 In Kentucky, the
Supreme Court held that the state had provided an efficient school sys-
tem when the common schools were substantially uniform throughout
the state and were available to all children in the state.221 Once an effi-
cient system is in place that meets the minimum quality of education, the
legislature can authorize supplementation of the state system. 222 Simi-
larly, the Washington Supreme Court held that the state cannot require
local school districts to resort to special excess levy elections to supple-
ment inefficient state funding. 223 By doing so, the state had failed to meet
its constitutional duty to "make ample provision for the education of all
children residing within its borders. '224 Gifted education programs
would only violate an efficiency clause if providing gifted education inter-
215. See, e.g., Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 804 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1991); Rose v. Coun-
cil for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
216. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I v. Washington, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978).
217. Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Montana, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989).
218. Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979).
219. Buse v. Smith, 247 N.W.2d 141 (Wis. 1976) (A district power equalization factor was intro-
duced into the school district financing procedure. Instead of receiving state aid, certain school dis-
tricts paid property tax revenues into the state fund. This violated Wis. CONST. art. VIII, sec. I
which required that "the rule of taxation shall be uniform..." A county tax must be used for county
purposes; it cannot be used to support the state government).
220. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 804 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1991) (interpreting TEX.
CONST. art. VII, § 1 (The legislature has a duty to maintain an efficient public school system). The
court never addressed education as a fundamental right).
221. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989). (Although this case
dealt with the efficiency clause of the constitution, the court recognized "that education is a funda-
mental right in Kentucky.") Id. at 206.
222. Id.
223. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I v. Washington, 585 P.2d 71, 98-99 (Wash. 1978) (since the special
excess levies were neither dependable nor regular, they failed to fulfill the state's constitutional duty
to "make ample provision for basic education.").
224. Id. at 78 (citing WASH. CONST. art. 9, § 1. The court went on to say that this constitutional
duty created a right, the right of the state's children "to have the state make ample provision for
their education.").
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fered with the state's minimum quality of education. Since the proposed
TAG Act does not take anything away from the minimum education
requirements, it would not be unconstitutional under a state efficiency
clause.
In state jurisdictions where education is not considered to be a fun-
damental right, the acceptance of federal funds under the proposed fed-
eral TAG Act would be constitutional. For example, in Pennsylvania, a
state TAG statute was challenged as unconstitutional in Lisa H. v. State
Board of Education.225 The plaintiff believed that her education was in-
ferior to that provided for students in the exceptional programs. She ar-
gued because fewer dollars were spent on her education than what was
spent on students in the TAG programs, there was a denial of equal edu-
cational opportunity. 226 The Pennsylvania constitution requires the legis-
lature to "provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and
efficient system of public education. '227 The court interpreted this clause
as creating a duty upon the legislature to provide for education generally,
not as an individual right of each student.228 Since that court viewed
education as a statutory right, not a fundamental right, the right could be
limited by the statutory provisions without violating the state constitu-
tional equal protection clause. 229
Even in states, however, like Kentucky and West Virginia, where
education is considered to be a fundamental right,230 acceptance of fed-
eral funds under the proposed federal TAG Act would pass an equal
protection challenge. An equal protection requirement does not prohibit
the state from spending unequal amounts. 231 Equal protection, in a struc-
ture viewing education as a fundamental right, requires a compelling in-
terest when financing is based on a classification in providing a
challenging education to gifted students. 232 The need to develop the high
quality education needed by each student to act in conformity with those
states' constitutional guarantees of a thorough and efficient education 233
provides that compelling interest. Therefore, acceptance of federal funds
under the proposed federal TAG Act would be acceptable under state
225. 447 A.2d 669 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1982).
226. Id. at 671.
227. PA. CONSTI. art. III, § 14.
228. 447 A.2d at 673.
229. Id. at 673-74.
230. See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 201 (Ky. 1989) ("[O]ur citizens
are given a fundamental right to education in our Constitution"); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859,
878 (W. Va. 1979).
231. Pauley, at 864-65.




constitutional challenges, whether or not education is considered to be a
fundamental right.
III. TALENTED AND GIFTED EDUCATION ACT
A. Purpose, Definition, and Identification
In order to fully develop the potential of gifted children, all factors
of the educational process must be firmly addressed in the proposed fed-
eral TAG statute. First, the students in need of TAG education must be
defined and then properly identified. Then, the statute must very specifi-
cally state its intent to provide an adequately challenging education. Fi-
nally, factors affecting the educational environment such as program
development, teaching standards, parental involvement, adequate fund-
ing, and program evaluation must clearly reflect the intent of the statute.
Having established that a federal statute is necessary to provide for
the educational needs of gifted children, the ultimate question is how to
insure that the statute addresses these needs. The proposed federal TAG
statute should be similar to the EHA by providing funds on the condition
of providing specific procedural safeguards that guarantee gifted children
a challenging education. The proposed TAG statute replaces the IEP
guaranteed by the EHA with more specific guidelines, such as providing
for a flexible learning structure and a variety of educational environ-
ments and programs. This allows the federal government a stronger voice
in establishing the minimal requirements of the program and standard-
izes the educational programs of the country while eliminating the IEP
burden for each gifted student. The establishment of procedural safe-
guards allows parental involvement in the educational process to better
insure that the individual child is appropriately placed within the gifted
program. Ideally, educational control that can continue to reside with
the states should be maximized, given the variety of school districts and
educational requirements that are unique to each district.234 Since the
size of the district affects the cost of instruction, the pool of teacher tal-
ent, and program flexibility,235 accommodation for these differences,
within certain federal guidelines, must reside with the state.
In spite of "talented or gifted" classifications for children in many
school programs, the definition of gifted is vague. Some statutes define
234. There are 15,577 school districts in the U.S. The student enrollment per district, ranges
from under 300 students to more than 25,000 students per district. NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCA-
TION STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 1989, at
90 (1989). These districts serve students in rural, urban, small town and suburban areas.
235. Meister & Odell, supra note 38, at 68.
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talented and gifted children as those children that exhibit outstanding
intellect, ability, or creative talent. 236 The definition has also been broad-
ened to include leadership ability, 237 specific academic strength,238 high-
level thought processes, 2 3 9 advanced learning ability 24 ° and divergent
thinking. 241 Some state statutes provide special education for talented
and gifted students, without defining talented or gifted.242
The definition of gifted will determine how many children are served
by TAG programs. A narrow definition that simply considers academic
achievement may exclude those students with creative giftedness or ex-
ceptional leadership abilities. A broader definition insures that a broad
spectrum of students will be included in the program. This variety of
students not only enhances the educational experience of each student,
but also lessens the image of an elite group. As the identification process
improves, the number of students receiving gifted education will increase.
However, involvement in the gifted program will vary depending on the
236. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 3063 (1988); ALASKA STAT. § 14.30.350(4)(C) (1987); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 14 § 3126 (1981); IND. CODE § 20-10.1-7-4.5 (Burns 1985); IOWA CODE § 257.44 (Supp.
West 1990); MD. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 8-201 (1989); MICH. COMp. LAWS § 388.1092 (West 1988);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-23-175 (1972); MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-7-901 (1989); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 79-339 (1987); NEV. REV. STAT. § 388.440 (Supp. 1989); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 4452(1)(a) (McKin-
ney Supp. 1990); OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 1210.301(1)(b) (West 1989); OR. REV. STAT. § 343.395(7)
(Supp. 1990); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-42-1(b)(l)(B) (1988); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.651 (West
Supp. 1990); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 392-170-035 (Washington's code refers to "highly capable
students" and defines them as students with "superior intellectual ability"); Wis. STAT. § 118.35
(West Supp. 1990); 22 PA. CODE § 13.1(ii) (1990).
237. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 3063 (1988); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 52202 (West Supp. 1990); IND.
CODE § 20-10.1-7-4.5 (Burns 1985); IOWA CODE § 257.44 (West Supp. 1990); OKLA. STAT. tit. 70,
§ 1210.301(l)(b) (West 1989); OR. REV. STAT. § 343.395(7)(d) (Supp. 1990).
238. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 3063 (1988); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 52202(West Supp. 1990); IND.
CODE § 20-10.1-7-4.5 (Burns 1985); IOWA CODE § 257.44 (West Supp. 1990); MD. EDUC. CODE
ANN. § 8-201 (1989); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 4452(1)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1990); OKLA. STAT. tit. 70,
§ 1210.301(l)(b) (West 1989); OR. REV. STAT. § 343.395(7)(b) (Supp. 1990); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-
42-1(b)(1)(B) (1988); Wis. STAT. § 118.35 (West Supp. 1990).
239. A high level thought process is the ability "to make valid generalizations about events,
people of things." ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 23 § 227.10 (1989).
240. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-761(4) (Supp. 1990). See also Mo. ANN. STAT. § 162.675(1)
(Vernon Supp. 1990) (gifted children are defined as children who exhibit the development of mental
capacity and learning potential).
241. Divergent thinking is the ability "to identify and consider multiple, valid solutions to a
given problem." ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 23 § 227.10 (1989).
242. See, e.g., ALA. CODE 16-39-2 (1987); FLA. STAT. § 236.1225 (West 1989); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 20-2-152 (Supp. 1989); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 8102 (1983); MINN. STAT. § 122.94 (West
Supp. 1990). See also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-770(A)(1) (Supp. 1990) (Arizona's school dis-
tricts must provide special education to students who score at or above the ninety-seventh percentile
on a state board approved test); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 6-42-106(b)(1) (1987) (in Arkansas, talented
and gifted is not defined, but program eligibility requirements are developed by the local school
district and approved by the state board of education). Many states may give a broad definition, such
as intellectually gifted or outstanding in school achievement or other areas of endeavor, and then
stipulate that the state department of education must promulgate rules and regulations for more
specific criteria. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-26-104 (1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1943
(West Supp. 1990); Va. Code Ann. § 22.1-253.13:1(D)(7) (Supp. 1989).
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student's needs. For example, a student may be solely gifted in music.
Therefore, the student will be involved in gifted music instruction. On
the other hand, a child that has an overall high intellect or a divergent
thought process may be in gifted programs for the entire school day.
Another gifted student may need both remedial math programs and
gifted language enrichment programs.
After the statutory definition of the kinds of students that should be
in the program, the challenge becomes the specific identification of those
gifted children in need of this special education. Identification of gifted
children is not an easy process. 243 State codes delegate the identification
process to the department of education. 244 Then the state departments of
education delegate the identification process to the local school boards,
usually with some regulatory standards. These standards may include
minimum criteria that the student must meet, usually comparing the
gifted candidate with the general student population. 245 The regulations
may also require evidence of the validity of the identification process and
some specific identification devices to be utilized.246
Identification methods are critical to the success of the program.
The identification methods used must be non-discriminatory and capable
of identifying those students that would otherwise be unidentified, such
as those with learning disabilities, lower socio-economic backgrounds, or
those with limited English proficiency. 247 Traditional identification
processes have overlooked many gifted characteristics. 248 Today, there
are many reasonable testing alternatives that can be used to identify
gifted students. However, the identification process must weigh the cost
of the testing process with the likelihood of correctly identifying the
gifted students. Testing for some characteristics, such as academic
achievement, is easier than testing for others, such as creativeness.
Specific identification techniques are subject to change, as better
243. One reason for the establishment of The National Center for Research and Development in
the Education of Gifted and Talented Children and Youth by the Federal Gifted and Talented Act
is to carry out research for identification of talented and gifted students. 20 U.S.C. § 3064 (1988).
244. ALASKA STAT. § 14.30.274 (1987); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 52202 (West Supp. 1990); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 22-26-104 (1988); OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 1210.301 (West 1991); ILL ADMIN. CODE tit.
23, § 227.50 (Supp. 1987).
245. ILL ADMIN. CODE tit. 23, § 227.40 (Supp. 1987).
246. Id.
247. Underachievers, and students that are economically disadvantaged or culturally different
are difficult to spot if they are withdrawn, passive, aggressive, hostile, or disruptive. Sorenson, supra
note 4, at 11.
248. Identification processes normally consider teacher nominations of students for gifted pro-
grams. These nominations are often erroneous. One study suggested that teachers often identify
average students as gifted and fail to nominate more than fifty percent of the TAG students that
should be in TAG programs. Sorenson, supra note 4, at 13.
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techniques are developed, and they are too complex to be specifically de-
fined in a statute. The process of identifying giftedness in a child with a
learning disability is different than that employed to identify a child with
no disabilities from an environment where education is emphasized. The
key to a good identification process is variety and flexibility. Selection for
a TAG program can include standardized intelligence or achievement
tests, and teacher, parent or peer nominations. 249 If specific identification
processes exclude an identifiable group, such as a racial or ethnic group,
then the identification process must be reviewed for legitimacy.
Another consideration of the identification process is to determine
when children should be tested, who should be tested and how often stu-
dents should be tested. Some gifted characteristics do not manifest them-
selves in the first grade. Consideration should be given to testing the
student population at specific intervals, such as every three years. Flexi-
bility for identification purposes should also allow students to be evalu-
ated on the request of the parent, teacher, or student. The ultimate goal
of the identification process is to include most of the children with gifted
characteristics, no matter how evident or hidden that characteristic may
be, or when the characteristic manifests itself.
Under the proposed federal TAG statute, the responsibility for de-
velopment of identification guidelines will rest with a Federal TAG Com-
mittee to be created within the federal department of education.
Identification is the critical factor to insuring that the students who need
the gifted programs are brought into them. It is more likely that non-
discriminatory testing methods will be developed on the federal level.
The Federal TAG Committee also will be responsible for the promulga-
tion of rules and regulations regarding the identification process, includ-
ing the specifics of who actually tests and identifies the gifted students
and what identification methods are used. In addition, this committee
must monitor the demographics of the students served by the gifted pro-
grams to determine the validity of the identification methods that are
promulgated.
B. Structure, Programs, and Teacher Requirements
While definition and identification provide the student body for the
TAG programs, the educational benefit is actually derived from the cur-
riculum and other educational programs. One of the critical factors of a
TAG program is flexibility. Gifted children represent a broad range of
talents and capabilities. A child may be musically gifted, but an average
249. Sorenson, supra note 4, at 11-14.
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or below average student in English. Or, a child exceptionally gifted in
math may have a learning disability that requires special education.
Some children and strengths benefit from acceleration, while other chil-
dren and strengths benefit from enrichment. Some learn better in groups,
others require independent study.
The first step to a flexible curriculum is to exempt the gifted student
from state laws that may actually stifle the learning process. These are
the laws related to age and time requirements. For example, mandatory
attendance in a school between two specific ages, such as from age 5
through age 16, may not be relevant to a child who has completed twelve
years of study in eight years and has completed curriculum requirements
by age 13. Time requirements, such as first grade at age 6, second grade
at age 7, etc., are detrimental when a gifted child has mastered the course
material in seven months. Even required minutes to be spent in a class-
room may not be relevant to a student who is involved in an independent
study project, or who is involved in researching and observing first hand
some facet of industry.
The proposed federal statute provides two optional educational envi-
ronments. These are an Honor School within a school or an entire school
that is dedicated to providing faculty, curriculum and equipment to
gifted students. Within either of these two structures, the student's pro-
gression must be based on course comprehension, not on chronological
age.250 This essentially provides for ability grouping; each classroom rep-
resents a particular level of students in the coursework, rather than rep-
resenting a particular age of students.
In addition, flexibility means that a variety of learning environments
are offered. For example, a child gifted in math may be adequately chal-
lenged with accelerated courses. A child gifted in language may need
enrichment courses. Some children are gifted in a very focused area, and
an independent study course may be ideal to provide an adequately chal-
lenging school environment. Other students may share a gifted trait, and
group work may need to be provided. With the variety of student needs,
the actual placement and offering of courses must be determined by the
local district. The success of the proposed TAG program depends on
several options being available to gifted students.
The goal of this TAG program is to provide an adequately challeng-
ing learning environment for gifted students. The EHA uses an "appro-
priate" education as the standard for measuring the effectiveness of
250. The learning process is more efficient and students are challenged to a greater degree when
students are grouped by ability, rather than age. Meister & Odell, supra note 38, at 82.
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programs. 25' The focus of this standard is whether the student is receiv-
ing some personalized educational services. 252 Later applications of this
standard have modified the standard from "some benefit" to some
"meaningful benefit. ' 253 There should be no doubt that a model TAG
statute should provide for more than a minimal education. The goal is
that virtually all students will be challenged by the educational process.
This does not mean that the potential of all gifted students must be maxi-
mized. 254 However, the environment should provide for growth of the
student's learning, rather than stifling the desire to learn.
Additionally, the benefits of any program are very dependent on the
qualifications of the teachers involved with gifted students. Some states
provide for special training for the personnel involved in TAG pro-
grams.255 These special qualifications range from college credit in TAG
education classes to training seminars. 256 In 1988, only 20% of gifted
education teachers were sufficiently trained to teach in a gifted curricu-
lum. 257 Many of the educational approaches used with gifted children are
very different from traditional schools. Educating teachers about what is
to be expected from gifted students should help reduce some of the fric-
tion that may otherwise result. It should be emphasized that not only the
"best" teachers are required as part of a successful TAG program. With
the proper motivation, and the necessary training, most teachers could be
successful TAG instructors.
C. Procedural Safeguards, Funding and Oversight
Parental involvement in education has been significantly reduced
over the last fifty years. 25 8 This certainly could be considered a factor in
the decline of education quality. As the educational structure has
changed from one-room schools to consolidated school districts, parental
251. See supra notes 76-83 and accompanying text.
252. Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 175, 195-97 (1982).
253. Polk v. Central Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 184 (3d Cir. 1988).
254. Gifted children who possess capability and talents that are above the top 2% may not have
their potential maximized. The cost of maximizing all children's potential would probably be prohib-
itive. These children could still be adequately challenged in the other areas of the learning process. In
other words, a musical prodigy will not receive private tutoring. But, the other areas of study that
this person must pursue will be in an environment that will encourage him or her to excel.
255. Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-23-177(e) (1972).
256. E.g., ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 23 § 227.50(a) (1989).
257. S. REP. No. 222, supra note 139, 135.
258. Ralph D. Mawdsley, Parental Rights and Public Education, 59 EDUc. LAW REP. 271
(1990). The issue of the parents' role in their children's education presupposes that the parents' and
the children's interest in education is identical. Id. Development of students' rights and the broaden-
ing role of the school board to impose requirements on students has caused a decline in the parents'
role in the education of their children. Id. at 273-74 n8.
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involvement in teacher and curriculum selection has become more dis-
tant. 259 Except in unusual cases, parents should still be considered a ma-
jor factor in determining what is right for their children. 26 Parents may
recognize the giftedness in a child that tests and other evaluation meth-
ods overlook.261 Input from parents can be an important factor in identi-
fying the gifted student.
The necessary role of the parents in a child's education is recognized
in the procedural safeguards provided in the EHA. Although the IEP is
not a part of the model TAG statute, there are still areas that should
allow for parental input. Specifically, testing, evaluation and placement
should be subject to review and agreement by the parents. A parent's
permission must be required for testing. After a child is placed in a par-
ticular program, the parents must be able to contest the appropriateness
of that educational environment for their child, particularly when there
are other options offered within their district that a parent believes are
more appropriate. For example, a parent may be the best judge regarding
whether acceleration is appropriate for the gifted student. However, as
with the EHA, the ultimate decision regarding placement of the child
would be resolved through a civil action in either the state or federal
court system when a due process hearing, as determined by state law,
fails to satisfy both parties.
The federal government will fund all additional costs that are re-
lated to the programming required under this Act. States would be free
to provide any additional funding they desire to further the TAG educa-
tion program. The only major cost related to TAG education is the test-
ing required for identification purposes. The additional costs per student
should not be a significant factor. In fact, for students who successfully
complete the twelve-year curriculum in less than twelve years, costs may
actually be less.
Overview of the proposed TAG program is provided by the creation
of state, regional, and federal TAG committees. There are two major
objectives for the creation of these committees. First, it is more efficient
to have a central group at the federal level gather and evaluate informa-
tion regarding particular gifted programs. Currently almost 50 states
have delegated program development to almost 15,000 local school dis-
259. Eugenia Hepworth Berger & C.R. Berger, Parents and Law: Rights and Responsibilities, in
EDUCATORS, CHILDREN AND THE LAW 38 (1985).
260. Some statutes specifically recognize the significance of parental involvement. California
TAG programs include procedures that assure the participation of parents in the planning and eval-
uation of TAG programs. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 52208 (West Supp. 1990).
261. VAIL, supra note 42, at 52.
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tricts. The Federal TAG Committee, with appointed experts in educa-
tion, should be able to make sound, practical and effective course
recommendations.
The second major objective is to allow some objectivity in program
administration. For example, if identification proceedings are not con-
ducted in a fair manner in one state, a regional council is more likely
than a state committee to find a violation.
In conclusion, it has been shown that there is sufficient federal inter-
est in the education of our gifted students to warrant federal involvement
in that education. Congress is authorized to create the proposed federal
TAG statute. It is time to tap a major resource of this nation and to enter
the next century with well-educated leaders who are prepared to safe-
guard the future of this nation.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
APPENDIX
FEDERAL TALENTED AND GIFTED
EDUCATION ACT
§ I. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE.
The purpose of this act is to provide assistance to the states in provid-
ing an adequately challenging education for all talented and gifted
students.
§ 2. DEFINITIONS WITHIN THIS ACT.
(A) Adequately challenging refers to educational programs and envi-
ronments that are within the range of the student's ability but difficult
enough to require considerable effort.
(B) Gifted and talented students are those children enrolled in the pub-
lic elementary or secondary schools who are capable of high perform-
ance in areas such as intellectual, creative, artistic, or leadership
capacity, or in specific academic fields, and who require services not
ordinarily provided by the schools to fully develop such capabilities.
Specific guidelines for students who qualify for educational programs
under this Act must be defined by the state TAG committees. These
definitions are subject to the approval of the Regional TAG Council.
(C) Honors School is a learning environment within a school that is
offered exclusively to students identified as talented or gifted.
(D) Talented and Gifted Schools are those schools that offer a special
curriculum to students identified as talented or gifted.
§ 3. IDENTIFICATION OF TALENTED AND GIFTED
STUDENTS.
Methods of identification of talented and gifted students shall be pro-
vided by the Federal TAG Committee, as provided in § 9(A) of this
Act. Methods of identification must ensure that talented and gifted
students are identified regardless of race, sex, creed, national origin, or
religion. The identification process should also ensure that students
from economically disadvantaged and varying cultural backgrounds
and physically handicapped children are identified.
§ 4. STRUCTURE FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF EDUCA-
TIONAL PROGRAMS FOR TALENTED AND GIFTED
STUDENTS.
(A) The educational environment for talented and gifted education
shall be determined by the local school districts, subject to approval by
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the state TAG committee, created within the state department of edu-
cation. Educational programs shall be provided in one of two educa-
tional environments.
1. Talented and Gifted Schools. Talented and Gifted Schools can
be provided where the faculty, curriculum, and facilities are pro-
vided exclusively for talented and gifted students.
2. Honors School. An Honors School can be organized within a
school. A portion of the faculty and a section of the facilities
should be allocated to the talented and gifted students in the
Honors School. The curriculum offered in the Honors School
consists of the approved talented and gifted programs.
(B) Classes within both educational environments must be offered as
individual education courses. Students must be allowed to progress on
an individual basis for each course. Classes must be structured by
course level and not by age.
(C) The local public school system shall, to the extent practicable and
allowable by law, allow the students of a Talented and Gifted School,
as defined in § 4(A)(1) to participate in any extracurricular activities
that the Talented and Gifted School cannot offer.
§ 5. EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS FOR TALENTED
AND GIFTED STUDENTS.
(A) The success of programs for talented and gifted students is depen-
dent on the recognition of the uniqueness of each student's talents and
abilities. Provision for each student's uniqueness shall be accomplished
through flexible programs and exemption from the following state
requirements:
1. Mandatory attendance. Talented and gifted students who have
completed the equivalent of twelve years of general education
(Grades 1-12) as provided by each state shall be exempt from
age related mandatory attendance requirements.
2. Time allocations. All state education requirements that include
minimum and maximum time requirements, including but not
limited to minimum and maximum number of days or hours of
instruction, shall be waived for students enrolled in approved
talented and gifted education programs.
(B) A minimum number of general education courses, as determined
by each state, must be completed by all students.
(C) At least one foreign language must be offered to all talented and
gifted students. Each student is required to complete the equivalent of
at least four years of one foreign language.
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(D) Educational programs must be offered in various ways, including
but not limited to, enrichment programs, independent study, accelera-
tion, and postsecondary education opportunities. Each school district
must offer some combination of acceleration and enrichment.
§ 6. MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS FOR TEACHERS OF
TALENTED AND GIFTED STUDENTS.
(A) Minimum qualification of all teachers of talented and gifted stu-
dents include the following:
1. Minimum licensing requirements of each state in which the
teacher is teaching.
2. Six college credit hour courses, or the equivalent, in the educa-
tion of talented and gifted students.
3. Annually, eight hours of continuing education, such as work-
shops, in the education of talented and gifted students must be
completed.
(B) Exceptions to these qualifications may be granted by the individual
state departments of education to instructors such as scientists, mathe-
maticians, visual and performing artists and community leaders who
are obtained from the community to teach in areas of special
concentration.
§ 7. FEDERAL FUNDS FOR TALENTED AND
GIFTED STUDENTS.
(A) Local school districts are eligible for federal funds for:
1. The average cost per pupil of educating each child who attends
a talented and gifted school as defined in § 4(A)(1), less the av-
erage cost per pupil of educating each such child at the public
school that the child would otherwise have attended.
2. The additional cost of each hour of gifted instruction received
by a student in an honors school as defined in § 4(A)(2).
(B) The cost of transportation for each child attending a school as de-
fined in § 4(A) shall also be eligible for reimbursement to the local
school district.
(C) The necessary costs of planning, construction, reconstruction, en-
largement, rehabilitation, or other improvement for the talented and
gifted school facility shall be eligible for federal funds, but for no more
than twenty percent of the cost.
(D) Funds will be provided for the additional educational require-
ments of educators of talented and gifted students under §§ 6(A)(2)
and 6(A)(3) of this Act.
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(E) Funds will be provided for reimbursement of reasonable transpor-
tation and lodging expenses, as otherwise allowed by the state, of all
advisory council members serving under the requirements of § 9 of this
Act.
(F) All costs directly related to the identification process mandated by
the Federal TAG Committee will be reimbursed by the federal
government.
§ 8. PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS.
(A) All educational agencies receiving funds under this Act must es-
tablish and maintain the procedures in this section to assure that tal-
ented and gifted children and their parents or guardians are guaranteed
procedural safeguards with respect to the provision of adequately chal-
lenging educational environments. Parents or guardians must be fully
informed, in their native language, of all of the procedural safeguards
provided in this section.
(B) Permission of the parents or guardians is required in order to test
or otherwise evaluate a child for placement in a talented and gifted
educational environment.
(C) Parents or guardians must be provided an opportunity to present
complaints with respect to any matter relating to the identification,
evaluation, or educational placement of a child who is receiving or may
be eligible to receive education in a talented and gifted environment.
The complaint may be presented at an impartial due process hearing,
conducted in accordance with state law.
(D) All decisions are subject to review by a committee selected by the
Regional TAG Council for Talented and Gifted Education.
(E) If any party is aggrieved by the Regional TAG Council's decision,
that party shall have the right to bring a civil action with respect to the
complaint presented pursuant to this section. The district courts of the
United States shall have jurisdiction of actions brought under this sub-
section without regard to the amount in controversy.
§ 9. TAG COMMITTEES.
(A) A Federal TAG Committee shall be created within the depart-
ment of education to carry out research and to promulgate rules and
regulations regarding methods of identifying talented and gifted stu-
dents and to evaluate the effectiveness of the identification process and
the talented and gifted programs.
(B) The Regional TAG Council shall consist of state representatives
from each state that accepts funds under this Act. This Council will
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report directly to the Federal TAG Committee. The number of repre-
sentatives from each state shall be determined by the number of tal-
ented and gifted students served by the state programs. The
representatives must be members of the state TAG committees. The
purpose of the Regional TAG Council is to centralize the development
of talented and gifted programs and to approve the state definition of
talented and gifted. The Council's responsibilities include summariz-
ing the talented and gifted programs within the region, reviewing the
number and type of students served by each type of program, and mak-
ing recommendations to state TAG committees regarding the pro-
grams that could be offered.
(C) Composition of the state TAG committee will be determined by
the state department of education within each state. All talented and
gifted programs must be approved by the state TAG committees. An
advisory council to this committee must be created. The advisory
council must be composed of educators and parents of talented and
gifted students and at least two talented and gifted students.
